Predicting North Korean Reform; Changing the North with a New Strategy by Kim, Won Ju
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 
2014 
Predicting North Korean Reform; Changing the North with a New 
Strategy 
Won Ju Kim 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/293 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 

















Predicting North Korean Reform: 
 























Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of 
International Affairs at the City College of New York 
 
Advisor: Dr. Jean Krasno 




Chapter I: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
  
 1. Intro .................................................................................................................... 1 
 2. Research Question ............................................................................................. 2 
 3. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 3 
 4. Limitations ......................................................................................................... 4 
 5. Thesis Statement ................................................................................................ 4 
 
Chapter II: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 6 
 
 1. Under New Leadership ...................................................................................... 6 
 2. Korean War II .................................................................................................... 7 
 3. Reunification ...................................................................................................... 8 
 4. Open Economy ................................................................................................... 9 
 5. Status Quo ........................................................................................................ 10 
 6. Korean Spring .................................................................................................. 11 
  
Chapter III: Korea ............................................................................................................ 13 
 
 1. Brief Korean History ........................................................................................ 13 
 2. Division of South and North ............................................................................ 18 
 3. Current Status - Republic of Korea .................................................................. 21 
 4. Current Status - Democratic People's Republic of Korea ................................ 24 
  
Chapter IV: DPRK Issues ................................................................................................ 32 
 
 1. Nuclear Weapons ............................................................................................. 32 
 2. NPT & IAEA ................................................................................................... 33 
 3. Sanctions .......................................................................................................... 37 
 4. Geneva Agreed Framework & Six-Party Talks ............................................... 50 
 5. Human Rights Violations - Prison Camps ....................................................... 59 
 6. Human Rights Violations - Defectors .............................................................. 69 
 
Chapter V: Arab Spring & North Korea .......................................................................... 81 
 
 1. Arab Spring - Most Impacted Nations ............................................................. 81  
 2. Synthesis & Analysis - North Korea ................................................................ 85 
   
Chapter VI: Kaesong Industrial Zone .............................................................................. 92 
 
 1. Background ...................................................................................................... 92 
 2. Sunshine Policy ................................................................................................ 93 
 3. Issues ................................................................................................................ 95 
 4. Stakes & Interests ............................................................................................ 97 
 5. Recommendations ............................................................................................ 98 
 





















 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a remarkably unique and 
obstinate nation.  It has firmly maintained its communist government system for over half 
a century.  The country has survived through both the second and third wave of 
democracy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese reform, the late 1990 famine, 
which resulted in a substantially high number of deaths, and significant pressure from 
both internal and external features such as United Nations sanctions.  It also has revealed 
its unwillingness to make any compromises by designating Kim Jong Un as the next 
leader who is the grandson of the regime founder - Kim Il Sung.  This research thesis, 
however, argues that North Korean reform will occur in the foreseeable future.  The 
paper specifically reviews the Arab Spring and analyzes the factors and conditions that 
caused the uprisings.  It then applies these discoveries to the DPRK case.  Among many 
other reasons, this thesis analyzes the economic aspects - the people's desire for economic 
betterment and higher living standards - as the key attributes for recent revolutionary 
events.  Globalization, the freedom of access to information and foreign goods across 
international borders, allows people to increase their want for betterment.  North Korea, 
too, is affected by this global integration and outside sources are entering the nation in 
various ways, such as the Internet.  Its citizens interact with South Koreans daily at the 
Kaesong Industrial Zone.  The country is currently facing the most difficult test of its era 
and this thesis argues that the regime will finally breakdown during the new 
democratization movement that is being called the fourth wave of democracy.
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1. Intro 
Korea was officially divided into two nations in the Fall of 1948.  Separated by 
the 38th parallel, the South formed the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the North became 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).  Since the division, the ROK has 
mainly focused on developing democracy and strengthening its economy.  Its economy 
grew very rapidly and successfully during the past sixty years, and has been utilized as an 
excellent case study and economic model for many underdeveloped countries.  The 
DPRK, in contrast, has continuously promoted the communist doctrine and advanced its 
military power.  It has isolated itself from the global community, violated international 
law on numerous occasions, and created a negative national image in worldwide media.  
It initiated the Korean War in June 1950, which caused over 2.5 million total deaths, 
including at least 1.5 million civilian lives.
1
  North Korea killed and attempted to 
assassinate South Korean government officials, including its presidents.  It started the 
nuclear weapons development program despite pressure from other nation states and 
frequent requests to abandon the program. The North traded weapons of mass destruction 
with various nations and exchanged illegal goods in the black market.  It recently 
destroyed a ROK warship with a torpedo missile and conducted an artillery attack on a 
South Korean island named Yeonpyeong.  It also violates international human rights laws 
and consistently puts its citizens at great risk.  
 It is time to change these headline stories. It is time to reform the DPRK and 
establish peace on the Korean Peninsula.  For the last sixty-six years, the two Koreas 
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have failed to construct a firm diplomatic relationship and have been identifying each 
other as an enemy.  This tension has only produced damaging consequences in all social, 
political, and economic aspects.  South Korea, for instance, spends approximately $30 
billion and 10% of its national budget on defense.
2
  The North uses roughly $10 billion 
and 16% on defense.
3
  It is finally time to bring an end to this long-lasting conflict and 
rewrite Korean history.  To reach this goal, however, there must be a new strategy. 
 The United States (US), the European countries, international governmental 
organizations, the ROK and the neighboring nation states have thus far implemented 
different methods to improve the situation.  World leaders, including American 
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, have visited the DPRK.  There were two Inter-
Korean Summits.  There was the Six-Party Talks.  The United Nations (UN) and the 
European Union (EU) have applied tough sanctions on North Korea.  South Korea and 
the global community have shipped a large amount of food and humanitarian aid to the 
North.  They have used carrot-and-stick methods to convince the country. But yet, 
nothing has worked and the DPRK has remained unchanged.  The Korean Peninsula is 
still one of the most heavily armed regions in the globe and a war is a constant possibility.  
This thesis, however, argues globalization and international commerce will serve as a 
new tool to turnaround this trend and permanently build security on the Korean Peninsula 
and further reunify the two Koreas.  
2. Research Question 
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 Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, "Defense Budget Status," 
http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/subview.jsp?id=mnd_010201010000, accessed March2014. 
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 For the sake of international security, peace on the Korean Peninsula and the 
safety of citizens in North Korea, the primary research question that this thesis seeks to 
analyze is the following: What are the key factors and conditions that initiated the Arab 
Spring and whether those conditions might bring about in North Korea the possibility of 
experiencing its own uprising.  Is there also any new type of phenomenon to stimulate 
North Korean reform?  
3. Methodology 
 This thesis first uncovers the features that affected the Arab Spring and then relate 
the findings to the DPRK.  The comparative analysis method is therefore the most proper 
approach and mainly utilized in the research.  There were more than 21 nations involved 
in the Arab Spring.  The thesis primarily reviews 6 countries that had the most significant 
impact: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain.  It examines their common 
reasons for revolution: authoritarianism, political corruption, weak economy, human 
rights violations, and cultural change.  It further evaluates what the nations were trying to 
accomplish such as democracy and regime change, and how they planned to achieve 
those goals including riots, protests, demonstrations, Internet activism, and self-
immolation.  The youth generation and security forces played an essential role in the 
rebellions and they are closely assessed as well in this paper. 
 The key sources for the research are academic journals, government publications, 
international institution reports, non-governmental organization research materials, books, 
and newspaper articles.  The major researched topics are the Middle Eastern uprisings, 
the affect of the Arab Spring on North Korea, and the present social, political and 
economic status of the North.  The research method applied was to use diverse search 
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engines to locate previously completed researches and studies by scholars and their 
observations on the issues.  The thesis also explores materials from South Korea since 
due to the nature of the subject more research is conducted in the South.  The paper 
author is proficient in written and spoken Korean.  The qualitative research method was 
employed throughout the study.  Some data and quantitative measurement are provided in 
certain areas but the majority of the information and conclusions are presented in 
descriptive expressions. 
4. Limitation 
 The major obstacle of this research is limited access to DPRK information.  For 
the past half century, the nation has emphasized its main ideology - independence and 
self-reliance - and isolated itself from the international community.  It has established 
diplomatic relations and trade partnerships with only a small number of countries like 
China.  It does not allow individuals to cross its borders easily.  Foreigners enter the 
nation with a large number of restrictions and risks.  With the exception of diplomats, 
North Korean citizens are disallowed from travelling outside the country.  In a nutshell, 
the North has one of the strictest closed-door foreign policies ever to exist.  For these 
reasons, it has been extremely difficult for scholars, students, journalists, researchers, 
government officials to study the facts about the DPRK and gather enough data to make 
proper judgments.  This thesis, therefore, makes arguments based on this limited 
information availability.  
5. Thesis Statement 
 After analyzing and applying the factors and conditions of the Arab Spring 
revolutions to the DPRK and reviewing its recent economic interaction with the ROK, 
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this thesis concludes that North Korea is facing the most critical challenge of its era and a 
























Chapter II: Literature Review 
1. Under New Leadership 
 Scholars, researchers and diplomats share different perspectives on the future of 
the DPRK.  Some argue that the regime will collapse as other communist nations have.
4
  
Some claimed that the status quo will prevail.
5
  Some contend that the nation will follow 
China and gradually make changes.
6
  Many also believe that it is too difficult to have 
predictions on North Korea.
7
  As it was evidently proven by its nuclear weapon 
development, the country has been hiding and lying about what is happening inside its 
borders. 
 People are now asking how the new young leader, Kim Jong Un, will dictate his 
nation's upcoming days.
8
  This question is particularly interesting due to his age.  He was 
born in 1983 and was in his late 20s when he took over the highest position.  Many 
individuals think that he is too young and inexperienced to lead the North.  The issue is 
also noteworthy since the country is under maybe the toughest sanctions that the UN has 
ever imposed on a nation state.  The DPRK, furthermore, is faced with historical events 
like the Arab Spring and is living through the era of globalization (Lynch, 2011).
9
  Today, 
there are no actual borders between countries.  Goods, services, and, most importantly, 
information are freely exchanged.  Even the most secured nation, North Korea, cannot 
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resist this powerful trend and outside news and stories are flowing into the country.  
Consequently, its citizens are beginning to discover that there is a better world outside, 
and that its government has been telling lies about other nations.  Foreign affairs experts, 
therefore, are very curious how things will turn out under the new leadership and whether 
reform will finally occur in the North. 
2. Korean War II 
 Under the new global settings, the DPRK's future faces quite a few scenarios.  
First, North Korea could cross the 38th parallel again and start a full-scale war - the 
Korean War II.
10
  This possibility, however, is extremely unlikely.  The North is well 
aware of the fact that the UN and more crucially the US will engage in the military 
conflict in accordance with the US-Korea Status of Forces Agreement and defend the 
ROK.  The DPRK knows that it cannot overpower US forces with its military capacity, 
weapons of mass destruction and even nuclear warheads.  Kim Jong Un and his staff 
would lose everything and flee to China.  The risk is too great to launch an attack and 
spend the rest of their lives in a foreign country as fugitives.  They know what the 
consequences were for both Iraq's long-time dictator Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda 
leader Osama bin Laden.   
 China's reaction to this clash will be a big question mark.  China and North Korea 
signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty.  Article 2 
of the Treaty indicates that the two nations agree to provide assistance in case either party 
is attacked by another state.  The Treaty was first signed in 1961 and is renewed every 
twenty years.  The latest re-signing took place in 2001 and will be effective until 2021.  
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The North Korean-Soviet Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty was also first 
signed in 1961 but has been discontinued since the 1990s.  China would have second 
thoughts about countering the US-ROK alliance.  It obviously would not want to fight a 
war against its largest trading and business partner.   
3. Reunification 
 Another improbable scenario is reunification (Kelly, 2011).
11
  The citizens of both 
South and North Korea are desperate to reunite with their separated families and to revisit 
their hometowns.  Both governments, however, are unwilling to accept such a 
circumstance.  The DPRK government is happy with its current situation.  They are living 
a high-class life and enjoying luxury goods and services, even though the majority of 
their people are living in poverty.  They would not give up their power and money that 
easily.  The ROK government wishes the North to change but sees the reunification as an 
event that has to take place at a later date.  There is a huge gap between the nations' 
economies.  The DPRK's latest recorded gross domestic product (GDP) is $14,411 
million (USD), ranked 120th in the world.  The ROK's most recently recorded GDP is 
ranked 15
th
 at $1,129,598 million.  The South would be heavily impacted by the 
reunification and it would have to spend an endless amount of money to finance the 
reconstruction of North Korean infrastructure and economy system.  This was shown by 
the German reunification.  West Germany somehow managed to recreate East Germany.  
But, South Korea is reluctant to go through such an ordeal.  China would also object to 
the idea of Korean reunification.  It is gaining too much by trading with the North and 
solely importing its natural resources. 
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4. Open Economy 
 Some individuals think that there is still an opportunity that the DPRK might 
become the next China.  Kim Jong Un would still be the supreme leader and the 
government would remain in power, but they would open the economy to the 
international community.  This assumption is wrong as well.  North Korea knows well 
that the free market system, multinational trade and foreign direct investment are critical 
elements for economic advancement.  It attempted to undertake economic reform three 
times in 1991, 2001 and 2010.  Each time, it struggled undergoing an economic and 
financial crisis.  In 1991, Kim Il Sung was starting to lose one of his closest allies, the 
Soviet Union, and the aid from the falling communist state.  In response, he established 
the Rajin-Sonbong special economic zone to enhance free trade.  The project, however, 
ended in less than ten years due to a corruption scandal which involved high ranking 
DPRK government officials.  In 2001, Kim Jong Il was anxious and desperate to recover 
the country's economy after surviving a devastating famine.  He reached out to his 
neighbor states including the ROK and requested help with loans, aids, and direct 
investments.  The South Korean president visited Pyongyang during this time and offered 
the Sunshine Policy.  This hopeful engagement, however, ended soon after the US 
invaded Iraq.  The North resumed its nuclear weapon development program.  Recently, in 
2010, Kim Jong Il tried to commence currency reform after the UN imposed a series of 
strict sanctions on the state.  His treasury department staff simply failed to properly 
implement economic policies and worsened its financial situation by creating a higher 
inflation rate.  The person in charge of the mission was later executed.   
10 
 
  Today, Kim Jong Un is operating the Kaesong Industrial Complex - a joint 
economic project with the ROK.
12
  These ventures normally last a short period of time 
and are progressing only on a small scale.  The nation needs to generate cash flow 
quickly only to maintain Kim Jong Un's spending habit.  After the UN and the EU 
imposed sanctions, the country's assets in foreign banks have been frozen and it can no 
longer bring in foreign currencies from black market businesses.  The leader also requires 
the money to keep his cabinet staff loyal by continuously providing them and their 
families with expensive goods.  Otherwise, they would begin to consider disobeying and 
overthrowing the leader.  The DPRK has no intention to follow the path China took and 
elect a reform that would adjust its entire economic system.  It knows too well that 
international trade and free market increases the chances of uprising by its dissatisfied 
and starving citizens. 
5. Status Quo 
 The DPRK future faces two possibilities and one of them is the maintenance of 
the status quo.
13
  Kim Jong Un would remain as the dear leader and continue his 
grandfather's legacy.  His son would take over the dictator position and his grandson after 
that.  It is like a family business and easily seen in Korean culture.  The founders of ROK 
conglomerates, such as LG, Samsung and Hyundai, all passed on ownership to their 
descendants.  One generation to the next, Kim Il Sung's philosophy and ideology would 
continue to carry on.   
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 The government system would stay the same as well.
14
  The communist doctrine 
and Juche ideology would still be the fundamental belief.  The nation would continue to 
strengthen its military capacity and upgrade their nuclear program and WMD 
development.  It would retain a very limited foreign policy and restrict international trade 
and participation in the open market system.  Legally, its citizens would not enjoy much 
freedom, have no voting rights, and the central government would control court rulings.  
The majority of its citizens would continue to live in poverty and believe that they live a 
better life than the people in other countries.  Global modernization would only affect the 
capital city of Pyongyang.  When satellites take pictures of the Korean Peninsula at night, 
the South is awash in light and the North is almost completely dark.  The Peninsula 
would keep this image and the DPRK regime would successfully sustain the authoritarian 
leadership for at least another century. 
6. Korean Spring 
 This thesis finds the other possibility more convincing and argues that there will 
soon be a North Korean case like the Arab Spring - the Korean Spring.
15
  The DPRK 
citizens, especially the young generation, will learn from the Internet that their 
government has been lying about everything, and that they could be living under better 
life conditions.  In this scenario, they will decide to organize a group of rebels and initiate 
a revolution.  They will figure that the military would play a substantial role and persuade 
the young officers to take their side.  With the support from the military-trained soldiers, 
the rebel group will put up a fight against the nation's security forces.  Some considerable 
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sacrifices are required, but the group will eventually succeed in ending Kim Jong Un's era 
and bring down communism in North Korea.  The Internet usage in the North and the 
younger generation and its involvement in the military service will thus be closely 
analyzed throughout this study.  There is a chance that this internal violence could force 
the DPRK government to launch a full-scale war against the South.  They would blame 
the ROK as the primary cause of this movement. But, the government would first fully 
concentrate on stopping the rebel unit and will not have enough armed personnel at a 
later stage, especially without the young fighters. 
 The critics of this probable scenario dissent the opposite based on two valuable 
points.
16
  One, the DPRK government system disallows such groups to gather and share 
new ideas to initiate any sort of riots.  The patrols closely monitor their citizens and 
prevent such secret meetings.  Two, the regime also controls the media and restricts 
Internet usage.  The objectors claim that not enough people are realizing the truth about 
the outside world and events like the Arab Spring due to strict constraints.  The country 
even limited the travelling of its diplomats and government officials to the Arab states 
while the revolutions were occurring.  More individuals must be informed and educated 
about the other side of the globe to form an uprising.  This thesis, however, verifies that 
these statements are no longer credible and circumstances have changed in North Korea 
in recent years.  New evidence indicates that the North will collapse within the near 
future.   
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Chapter III: Korea 
1. Brief Korean History 
 The two Koreas share a rich history of prosperity and conflicts.  Throughout the 
five thousand years of Korean history, many kingdoms had their glories and failures on 
the Korean Peninsula.  The territorial boundary was constantly redefined due to struggles 
among the different regimes present on the Peninsula.  In ancient Korea, as many as six 
independent states coexisted at a time.  The unification was achieved by those Kingdoms 
with advanced technology and a powerful army.  Sometimes, an alliance with ancient 
China was used to achieve unification on the Peninsula.  Nevertheless the longevity of 
each kingdom was always tested on its ability to fight against foreign incursions from 
ancient China and especially Imperial Japan.
17
 
  During the Bronze Age, Gojoseon, the first civilization to appear in the Korean 
Peninsula, emerged in 2333 B.C.  The mythical figure Dangun, which means chief priest, 
was credited to unite tribes living in the northern part of Korea and Manchuria.  The 
introduction of iron during the Gojoseon period led to the development of agriculture and 
a centralized political structure, and the state became strong enough to maintain a trading 
relationship with the Han Empire of China, at least until it fell to the Han (108 B.C.).  
The fall of Gojoseon led to the rise of a number of states, such as Buyeo, Okjeo, Dongyea, 
and the Three Hans in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula.  The Jin state was 
formed in the southern part of the Peninsula (300 B.C.).  These states were a 
confederation of tribes and were based on the technology of iron.  
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With the decline of the Han, the Chinese influence gradually diminished in the 
Korean Peninsula, and the Three Kingdoms, Goguryeo, Bekjae, and Shilla emerged (57 
B.C. – 667 A.D.).  Goguryeo, located in the northern part of the Peninsula, became the 
strongest and largest state absorbing Buyeo into its territory.  Bekjae and Shilla occupied 
the west and east sides of the southern part of the Peninsula.  Each of the Three 
Kingdoms started as a federation of different tribes as seen in earlier forms of civilization.  
The common factor among the Three Kingdoms was the development of agriculture.  The 
dependency on rice cultivation led to the formation of a rigid social hierarchy with a 
powerful ruling class.  The Three Kingdoms used similar languages and shared cultural 
influences from China.  Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism greatly affected the social 
and cultural atmosphere.  During the Three Kingdoms period, Gaya emerged at the far 
south end of the Korean Peninsula.  However, with Bekjae and Shilla as a constant threat, 
it was unable to evolve beyond a federation of tribes and eventually fell under the Unified 
Shilla. 
The weakening of Goguryeo, the largest and most powerful of the Three 
Kingdoms, was a major milestone to the unifying of the Three Kingdoms.  Shilla was 
able to defeat the Gaya state, Bekjae, and Goguryeo using its alliance with the Tang 
Dynasty of China (668 A.D), and became the Unified Shilla.  After unification, the 
centralized ruling structure was enhanced by two new practices: the appointment of a 
successor during the King’s reign, and the organization of six bureaus to oversee public 
affairs.  The extended peace and prosperity resulted in cultural advancements, such as the 
construction of a large-scale Buddhist temple, Bulguksa, and an astronomical observatory, 
Chomsungdae.  However, dependence on agricultural production gave much power to 
15 
 
regional warlords, and heavy taxation resulted in a series of farmer uprisings.  Meanwhile, 
in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, the descendants of Goguryeo managed to 
reappear in Manchuria as Balhae (698 A.D.), stretching up to the Amur River.  This is 
thought to be the northernmost region that ancient Koreans have historically occupied.  
Balhae came to an end with the defeat of the Kitan of China (926 A.D.). 
Unified Shilla declined as regional warlords claimed independence.  Meanwhile, 
post-Bekjae and Goguryeo appeared until Wang-goen established Goryeo (918 A.D.).  
Wang-Geon unified the Korean Peninsula, and reclaimed a part of the Goguryeo territory.  
The name Goryeo was derived from Goguryeo, which also became the origin for the 
country name - Korea.  As previous countries in the Korean Peninsula, Goryeo struggled 
against constant foreign attacks from the north.  Goryeo relocated its capital city 
southward as a defense strategy against the Mongols.  During this time, Tripitaka 
Koreana or Palman Daejanggyung, which means 81,258 letters of Buddhist scriptures, 
was created by monks whose spiritual yearning for peace led to the making of the 
magnificent volume of wooden letter blocks.  The treasure has been stored at the Haeinsa 
Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
18
 
Goryeo was overthrown by its general Yi Sung Gye, who successfully suppressed 
the Jin Dynasty of China in Manchuria, and Japanese pirates in the south of the Peninsula.  
The Yi Dynasty established Joseon in 1392.  To strengthen his power, Yi upheld 
Confucianism as the national ideology as opposed to Buddhism to shed Goryeo’s 
remaining influence.  Civil and military officials were selected through open examination 
testing on Confucian literature.  As a result, national institutions for scholars and private 
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learning academies flourished, and a new elite class well versed in Confucianism called 
the Yang Ban appeared.  Successful economic and agricultural reforms during the early 
years improved the lives of common people, and paved the way for remarkable 
advancements, such as the Korean alphabet, or Hangeul by King Sejeong.  Prior to the 
creation of Hangeul, all written communications were in Chinese characters, and only 
those who received the proper education were literate.  The phonetic-based letter system 
was easier to learn and became the language of common people.  During Joseon, the first 
paper money was issued, and the comprehensive legal system based on the National Code, 
or Gyung Gook Dae Jun, further modernized the country.  The central bureaucracy of the 
Yi Dynasty continued to thrive despite the rising of political factions by powerful 
regional landowners.  However, Joseon was not immune to foreign incursions.  A series 
of Japanese invasions, including the devastating attack from warlord Hideyoshi greatly 
undermined Joseon.  Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, Korea refrained from all 
trading and diplomatic relationships with foreign countries including Japan, US, France, 
and Russia.  Korea was known as the “Hermit Kingdom.”  This continued until the last 
empress of Joseon, Queen Min, opened the doors to foreign powers, believing that cordial 
diplomatic relationship with Western powers could act as a shield against Japan.  
However, after winning a battle with the Qing of China, Japan began its imperialist 
agenda in the Korean Peninsula by assassinating Queen Min (1895) and abducting King 
Gojong to Japan.  It was the start of the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910, the 
oppression lasting 35 years. 
 Imperial Japan exploited natural resources and the Korean people for the further 
expansion of its power under the Eulsa Treaty in 1905.  Use of Korean language and 
17 
 
custom was banned, and people were forced to adopt Japanese surnames.  In a desperate 
effort to avoid the unfair treaty, King Gojong sent his agents to the Hague Conference, 
the international peace convention held in 1907.  However, Japan managed to deter the 
mission, and King Gojong's attempt to plea to other countries ultimately failed.  Stripped 
of dignity and freedom, independence movements such as the March 1
st 
demonstration 
took place.  Secret resistance activists set up a provisional Korean government, led by 
Lee Seung Man in Shanghai, China.  Lee Seung Man later became the first president of 
South Korea.  There were also organized armed forces battling against the Japanese in 
Manchuria.  Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, was the main guerrilla leader 
during this struggle.  Korea regained its sovereignty with the surrender of Japan and the 
end of World War II in 1945.  A new type of ideological clash, however, was gradually 









Figure 1-2: (Top right) Balhae and Unified Shilla, 8
th
 Century  
Figure 1-3: (Bottom left) Goryeo, 11
th
 Century  
Figure 1-4: (Bottom right) Joseon, 15
th
 Century  
(Korean Culture & Information Service) 
2. Division of South and North Korea 
During the Cairo Conference in 1943 the US, United Kingdom, and China agreed 
to put in military forces until the surrender of Japan.  The declaration made at the 
conference also acknowledged the independence of Korea.  After the defeat of Japanese, 
however, Korea was divided as the Soviet Union and the US had a shared interest of 
preventing Japan’s potential aggression in the Korean Peninsula.  At the Malta 
Conference in 1945, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily deploy its 
military forces until Korea successfully established its own government.  An arbitrary 
line was drawn at the 38th parallel.  The Soviet Union resided on the north side of the 
line, while the US took on the south side of the line.   
19 
 
 With an escalation of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula became the ground for 
political, military, and ideological struggles.  Those who participated in the resistance 
activities during Japanese colonization had different ideas about how the Korean 
government should be organized after independence.  The Soviet Union supported Kim Il 
Sung, who envisioned a unified Korea with a communist ideology.  On the South, Rhee 
Seung Man, who had led the provisional government in Shanghai during the Japanese 
occupation, was preparing a democratic government supported by the US.  Both leaders 
strongly believed that Korea should not be divided and that unification should be 
achieved under one ideology. 
The UN-sponsored election was held in 1948, and Rhee Seung Man was elected 
as the first president of the Republic of Korea.  However, supporters of Kim Il Sung did 
not acknowledge the result, which resulted in the formation of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea.  In the South, political controversy aroused as President Rhee claimed 
the intention of unification by force.  The US, however, withdrew its military support 
from South Korea to deescalate the tension building up in the Pacific area.   At the time, 
the US believed that the ROK should instead seek assistance from the UN.
19
   Seizing the 
opportunity, Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea on July 25th, 1950, to achieve his goal of 
unifying Korea under the communist regime.  The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 
was backed up with tanks and artillery supplied by the Soviet Union.  The better-
equipped NKPA easily crushed the ROK army, pushing the frontier southward.  The US 
then called on the Security Council of the UN to send troops to South Korea.  The NKPA, 
however, was able occupy down to Busan, the port city located at the south end of the 
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Peninsula.  It was the General McArthur’s brilliant operation, a sudden attack at the port 
of Incheon located west of the 38
th
 parallel that caught NKPA off guard.  Dispersed force 
of NKPA was finally under control under the joint forces of ROK army and the US allies.  
The frontier was moved up past north of the 38
th
 parallel to the border of Manchuria.  At 
the time, a prediction of the unification of Korea under the democratic government 
prevailed. 
Threatened by the victory of the US Allies at its border, Communist China 
intervened, taking the side of North Korea.  The unexpected turn of events returned the 
frontier of the Korean War to where it first started, at the 38
th 
parallel.  The divisive line 
further solidified as the North Korean forces and the South Korean allies tightly held the 
positions of defense.  In 1951, the armistice talk began.  The result was an indefinite truce 
along the 38
th 
parallel with the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where 
neither North Koreans nor South Koreans could enter.  The Korean War was agreed to be 
on indefinite hold in 1953. 
After the end of the Korean War, the DPRK and the ROK went on separate ways.  
Kim Il Sung established his own political ideology called Juche, or “self- reliance” as the 
principles of government.  Juche was enforced to an extent of being a political religion 
and idolization of Kim Il Sung and his family.
20
  The idea of Juche was translated into the 
three main principles - political independence, economic self-sustenance, and self-
reliance in defense.  Rather than being an application of Socialism or Communism, Juche 
became the tool for an execution of the policies and rules that solidified Kim Il Sung’s 
control over people in North Korea. 
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 In the South, Rhee Seung Man continued his leadership as the first president of 
South Korea.  However, his political repression of his opponents, such as the massacre of 
Communist rebels, and his authoritarian governing style became controversial.  Rhee 
Seung Man attempted to amend the constitution to be re-elected solely upon popular vote.  
Rhee managed to serve as the president for four consecutive terms, however, a revolution 
led him to resign, and he was exiled to the US.  In the following years, South Korea 
underwent economic hardship and political struggles against a series of military regimes 
until the 1960s. 
 
Figure 1-5: (Left) Current map of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Figure 1-6: (Right) Current map of the Republic of Korea  
(CIA World Factbook) 
 
3. Current Status - Republic of Korea 
After the Korean War, the ROK had a GDP equivalent to that of a Third World 
country, even lower than the DPRK’s figure.  It took several decades for South Korea to 
evolve into what it is today.  During this turbulent time, the authoritarian president Park 
Jung Hee came with an agenda to put South Korea on track for rapid economic 
development.  The former president Park had a controversial reputation for incidents of 
violent suppression of civilian demonstrations.  At the same time, he was credited with 
22 
 
establishing the groundwork for rebuilding from the remains of the Korean War.  The 
unparalleled economic progress was known as the “Miracle of the Hangang River” and 
became a model for developing countries. 
Today, South Korea has become the 13
th
 largest economy in the world with a 
growth rate of 2.8%.
21
  The labor force was comprised of 25.86 million people, mostly 
engaged in industry and services sector by occupation.
22
  The unemployment rate was 
3.4%, in 2011,
23
 while the population below poverty line was 16% in 2009.
24
  The direct 
foreign investment was $275.5 billion at the end of 2012.
25
  The gross domestic product 
(GDP) amounted to $1.666 trillion in 2013.
26
  Due to the limitation of natural resources, 
over 50% of GDP relies on export, which was $557.3 billion in 2013.
27
  The major 
exporting partner countries were China, US, and Japan.
28
  The composition of GDP 
consisted of 58.2% in the services sectors, 39.2% in industry, and 2.6% in agriculture.
29
  
The major export items were semiconductors, petrochemical product, petroleum products, 
vessels, and machinery in 2011.
30
   
Exports are not only limited to tangible goods.  Starting from the early 1990s, 
Korean pop culture products such as music, drama, and entertainers became a huge hit, 
first in Asia and then, on a global scale.  In 2011, the cultural export amounted to $4.2 
                                                          
21
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook – Korea, South,” 




United Nations, “Country Profile – Republic of Korea,” 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Republic%20of%20Korea.Accessed March 2014. 
24












Korean Culture and Information Service, “About Korea – 





  The spread of Korean culture was also based on the advanced IT infrastructure.  
The South has the world’s fastest average broadband speed and 39.4 million Internet 
users, ranking the 11
th
 in the world.  Having the 8
th
 largest trade volume in 2011,
32
 the 
ROK imports as much as it exports.  Imports amounted to $516.6 billion on items like 
machinery, electronics, oil, steel, transport equipment, organic chemicals, and plastics.
33
 
South Korea has a mixed legal system combining European civil law, Anglo-
American law, and Chinese classical thought.
34
  Since it was created in 1948, the 
Constitution underwent 5 major revisions.  The last revision was dated in 1987 and 
currently the South is referred to as the 6th Republic.  Based on the Constitution three 
institutions work as part of the checks and balances system similar to that of the US.  The 
President serves as the head of the Executive Branch.  During earlier republic years, some 
presidents exploited their powers to extend presidential terms, which led to the 
constitutional changes.  The Legislative power falls under the National Assembly. The 
National Assembly is comprised of 300 members who are the representatives of regional 
Gu districts.  The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court. The 13 justices are selected by the President with the consent from the National 
Assembly. There are two major political parties, New Frontier Party or the Conservative, 
and Democratic Party or the Liberal.  
While the economic expansion was the first priority, national defense was always 
an important issue for the ROK government.  Since the Korean War ended in a truce, 
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South Korea utilized its alliance with the US as well as its national manpower.  Over 50 
American army bases are installed throughout South Korea and joint military exercises 
with the South army are performed annually.  The ROK armed forces are comprised of 
the army, navy, and air forces.  Total 2.8% of GDP accounted for military expenditure 
ranking the 26
th
 place in the world.
35
  South Korea is also one of the two countries in the 
world that requires all eligible men to serve in a military for 21 to 24 months by law.  
They make up for a reserve force known as the ROK Civil Defense Corps.   
4. Current Status - Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 Occupying the north side of the Peninsula, the DPRK is located in a temperate 
weather zone, having four distinct seasons with heavy rainfall during the summer.
36
  The 
landscape is comprised mostly of hills and mountains.  While there is 19% of arable land, 
this ratio is on decline.
37
  Compared to the ROK, North Korea has a relatively adequate 
amount of natural resources such as coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnetite, iron 
ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, and hydropower.
38
  Due to poor management of 
resources and deteriorated infrastructure, the North has environmental problems such as 
water pollution, inadequate supplies of potable water, waterborne disease, deforestation, 
soil erosion, and degradation.
39
 
Although the DPRK government does not publish official data on its daily 
activities, available information can provide a snapshot of its people and society.  The 
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population of North Korea was 24.5 million people in 2012 at the growth rate of 0.4%.
40
  
The population growth rate is higher than that of South Korea, yet the actual population is 
half the number of South Korea.  The estimated breakdown of the population by age 
groups in 2014 is as follows: 21.5% are under 14 years, 16.3% are between 15 to 24 years, 
while the majority, 44% of population falls under the working age, which is 25 to 54 
years.
41
  Some 9.7% of population is between 55 to 64 years and the rest, 9.5% is 65 
years and over.
42
  The median age is 33.4 years, which is 7 years younger than median 
age of South Korea.
43
  Approximately14.51 births and 9.18 deaths per 1,000 people are 
estimated in 2014.
44
  Both rates are much higher than those of South Korea.  The infant 
mortality rate was 25.1 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010.
45
  Urban population is 60.3% 
of total population, and the major urban area is the capital, Pyongyang, with 2.843 
million people in 2011.
46
  The literacy rate in North Korea is 100%, which means every 
person in North Korea over 15 years of age is literate.
47
  This may indicate that literacy of 
its citizen is important for North Korean government in reinforcing its political 
propaganda.  Independent religious activities are forbidden.  Instead, cult-like idolization 
of the founder Kim Il Sung and the Kim Family is encouraged.  Those expressing 
opposition will be sent to the prison camps.  However, to create the false impression of 
having religious freedom, the government approves the existence of some religious 
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groups, such as Christian and the indigenous Korean religion Chondogyo, which means 
the Religion of the Heavenly Way.  
 The legal system of the North is a civil law system based on the Prussian model 
with influences from Japanese tradition and the Communist legal theory.  Although all 
power is concentrated on its current leader Kim Jung Un, North Korea still has three 
entities - the executive branch, legislative branch, and judicial branch. The executive 
branch has absolute power demonstrated by the dictatorship of the Kim Family.  Since 
December 2011, the third generation of the founder, Kim Jong Un has served as the first 
secretary of the Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea.  Kim also holds the position of the 
Chief Commander of the Korean People’s Army.  The legislative branch is represented 
by the Supreme People’s Assembly or Ch’oego Inmin Heoui, which is comprised of 687 
members, who are selected by the ruling party.  The ruling party approves a list of 
candidates to be elected and North Korean citizens have to “vote.”  Election results 
usually go without any opposition because it actually serves as a tool for weeding out the 
ideological defectors.  It is interesting to note that the DPRK government requires its 
citizens to go through the election process, which embodies the freedom of choice, even 
if it is a fairytale.  The election result, which is 100% affirmative, is used to further 
validate its political regime.  The judicial branch is represented by the Supreme Court or 
Central Court, which consists of the chief justice and two “People’s Assessors.”  Judges 
are elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly for 5-year terms.  Government regulations 
are also reinforced at the subordinate level of courts and there are provincial, municipal, 
military, and people’s courts.  There is only one major political party in North Korea.  
The Korean Worker’s Party, under its leader is Kim Jong Un’s control, also oversees the 
27 
 
other minors parties, such as Chondoist Chongu Party and Social Democratic Party. 
Although not active in the international community, North Korea belongs to some 
international organizations such as the UN, the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
regional forum.  The complete list of organizations that the North belongs to is as 
follows; ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IOC, IPU, ISO, 
ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, 
WIPO, and WMO.
48
  The DPRK is not actively involved in the international community 
and its diplomatic relationships are limited to China, Russia, and Pakistan.  There is no 
diplomatic representation from the US.  However, the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang 
represents the US as consular protecting power.  In America, North Korea has a 
permanent mission to the UN in New York.   
After the Korean War, the North was in a better economic situation than the ROK.  
Based on Kim Il Sung’s philosophy of self-reliance or Juche, the DPRK people were 
encouraged to be part of the collective labor force in building the strongest nation in the 
world.  The imagery of North Korea being the most prosperous nation was constantly fed 
to its citizen as motivation.  During the early years, the sustenance of North Korea was 
possible due to aid from the Soviet Russia and China.  However, the continued large-
scale military spending slowed the development of crucial industries and improvement of 
civilian life.  Inadequate response to the famine in 1995 was critical and resulted in 
nationwide starvation, leaving the citizens in the North in poor living conditions.  Since 
2002, the government has allowed private farming and small-scale farmer’s markets to 
increase the agricultural output.  In 2009, the government carried out the redenomination 
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of currency, only to bring about inflation.  In recent years, the DPRK has acknowledged 
the importance of foreign investment for its survival. It established bilateral economic 
cooperation with South Korea by establishing joint economic ventures such as the 
Kaesong Industrial Zone.   
The current economic standing of North Korea can be best described as deficient.  
The total estimated amount of GDP was $12,385 million in 2011.
49
  The GDP per capita 
was $506 at the growth rate of -0.1% in 2011.
50
  Most GDP was created from agriculture 
(23.4%) and industry (47.2%) sectors, while 29.4% was from the services sector in 
2012.
51
  The source of GDP came from the industries of military products, machine 
building, electric power, chemicals, mining of natural resources, metallurgy, textiles, 
food processing, and tourism.
52
  Agricultural products included rice, corn, potatoes, 
soybeans, pulses, cattle, pigs, pork, and eggs.
53
  The total estimated labor force was 12.6 
million in 2011, comprised of 71.6% of female population and 83.7% of male 
population.
54
  Of the labor force, 35% was reported to have worked in agriculture, while 
the rest worked in industry and the services sectors in 2008.
55
  Export is limited but 
currently it amounts to $3.954 billion in 2012, ranking 122th in the world.
56
  Exported 
products included minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures including armaments, 
textiles, agricultural and fishery products.
57
  Imports amounted to $4.828 billion in 2012, 
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place in the world.
58
  Imported goods were petroleum, cooking coal, 
machinery and equipment, textiles, and grain.
59
  China and South Korea have been the 
only trading partners to the North.  Two third of export and import occurred with China, 
while the rest of the exchange was carried out with the South.
60
 
The DPRK provides controlled channels of information to its citizens.  
Independent media is nonexistent and radios and TVs are pre-tuned to government 
stations.  The Korean Worker’s Party controls and operates the Korean Central 
Broadcasting Station, and state-run station, the Voice Korea.  The government restricts its 
citizens listening to all foreign broadcasts.  The freedom house index for North Korea is 
7.0 which translates to being “not free,” compared to the rating of the ROK (2.0) and the 
US (1.0), which translates to being “free.”
61
 The main communication infrastructure is 
telephone lines and there were 1.18 million main lines in use in 2011, ranking 70
th
 place 
compare to the rest of the world.
62
  The quality of telephone system is adequate, which is 
based on nationwide fiber-optic network.  Mobile cellular phone users were 1.7 million in 
2012 and the technology was provided by Orascom Telecom Holding, an Egyptian 
company which launched mobile service in 2008 for the Pyongyang area.
63
  Intranet 
exists within the North but restricted to chats, e-mails, and government approved 
websites mainly used among universities and institutions.
64
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The DPRK has been spending much of its national resources and human capital 
on its military forces.  The Korean People’s Army which is comprised of ground forces, 
navy, air force, and civil security forces. According to the annual publication from the 
Ministry of National Defense of South Korea there are about 1 million in the ground 
forces, 60 thousand in the navy, and 110 thousand in the air force.
65
  There are total 1.2 
million soldiers and this number is twice as much as the number of the South soldiers.
66
  
The International Institute for Strategic Studies revealed in 2010 that North Korea has the 
4th largest army per population (49 military personnel per every 1000 people) in the 
world, which demonstrates the level of concentration of armed forces.
67
  Approximately 
22.3% of GDP was spent as military expenditure, which was $8.21 billion in 2008.
68
  
Compare to the ROK’s military expenditure, which was $26.1 billion, the North’s 
spending amount is less than one third of South Korea’s number.  However, the DPRK 
employs the “asymmetrical strategy,” which focuses on the weak point of the South 
forces to make the most of their resources.  North Korea’s asymmetrical strategy was not 
considered a threat until the recent incident of sinking the ROK navy corvette Choen’an.  
The North is equipped with about 70 submarines including 1,830-ton Romeo-class and 
330-ton Shark-class submarines.
69
  Ballistic missiles are another part of the asymmetric 
strategy and the firing of missiles for sake of testing is used every now and then to send a 
message to South Korea and its allies.   
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Table 1: Comparison between South Korea and North Korea (CIA World Factbook, UN 
Data) 
                                     COUNTRY 
CATEGORY 
South Korea North Korea 
People 
& Society 
Population 49,039,986 (2014 est.) 24,851,627 (2014 est.) 
Population Growth 
Rate 
0.16% (2014 est.) 0.53% (2014 est.) 
Population by Age     
0-14 years 14.1% (male 3,603,943/female 3,328,634) 21.5% (male 2,709,580/female 2,628,456) 
15-24 years 13.5% (male 3,515,271/female 3,113,257) 16.3% (male 2,041,861/female 1,997,413) 
25-54 years 
47.3% (male 11,814,872/female 
11,360,962) 
44% (male 5,465,889/female 5,456,850) 
55-64 years 12.7% (male 3,012,051/female 3,081,480) 9.7% (male 1,007,667/female 1,127,455)  
65 years and over 12.3% (male 2,570,433/female 3,639,083) 9.5% (male 826,175/female 1,590,281) 
Birth Rate 8.26 births/1,000 population (2014 est.) 14.51 births/1,000 population (2014 est.) 
Death Rate 6.63 deaths/1,000 population (2014 est.) 9.18 deaths/1,000 population (2014 est.) 
Infant Mortality 
Rate 
3.93 deaths/1,000 live births 24.5 deaths/1,000 live births 
Urban Population 83.2% of total population (2011 est.) 60.3% of total population (2011 est.) 
Major SEOUL  9.778 million (2009 est.) PYONGYANG 2.843 million (2011 est.) 
Urban Cities Busan  3.439 million (2009 est.)   
  Incheon  2.572 million (2009 est.)   
  Daegu  2.458 million (2009 est.)   
  Daejon 1.497 million (2009 est.)   
Literacy Rate 97.9% (2002) 100% (2008) 
Economy 
GDP $1.12 trillion (2011 est.) $12.4 billion (2011 est.)  
GDP per Capita $23,000 (2011 est.)  $500 (2011 est.) 
GDP Growth Rate 2% (2012 est.)  1.3% (2012 est.) 
GDP Breakdown     
Agriculture 2.6% (2013 est.) 23.4% (2012 est.) 
Industry 39.2% (2013 est.) 47.2% (2012 est.) 
Services 58.2% (2013 est.) 29.4% (2012 est.) 
Labor Force 25.86 million (2013 est.) 12.6 million (2012 est.)  
Export $547.9 billion (2012 est.)  $3.954 billion (2012 est.) 
Exporting Goods 
semiconductors, wireless 
telecommunications equipment, motor 
vehicles, computers, steel, ships, 
petrochemicals 
minerals, metallurgical products, 
manufactures (including armaments), 
textiles, agricultural and fishery products 
Import $519.6 billion (2012 est.)  $4.828 billion (2012 est.) 
Importing Good 
machinery, electronics and electronic 
equipment, oil, steel, transport equipment, 
organic chemicals, plastics 
petroleum, coking coal, machinery and 
equipment, textiles, grain  
Freedom House 
Index 
2.0 / Free 7.0 / Not Free 
Military 
Military 
Expenditures as % 
of GDP 
2.8% (2008) 22.3% (2008 est.) 
Military Spending $26.1 billion (2008) $8.213 billion (2008 est.) 
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IV. DPRK Issues 
1. Nuclear Weapons 
A. Development 
 The DPRK initiated nuclear development in 1964.  The nuclear weapon was one 
way to rebuild and strengthen its military after the loss of the Korean War.  The nation 
discovered uranium deposits in the Yongbyon area and assembled the first nuclear 
research center.  The set up was helped by the Soviet Union.  So far, there have been a 
total of three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013.  There have also been ballistic missile 
tests in the same years.  The missiles are capable of carrying nuclear bombs to long-
distance destinations.  Despite a significant amount of pressure from the international 
community, North Korea never gave up its desire to obtain nuclear weapons.  There have 
been pauses to the process followed up by a series of negotiations.  Its ultimate goal, 
however, has always been to become a nuclear state.
70
 
B. The Need 
 The DPRK wants nuclear weapons for two specific reasons.  One, the arsenals 
provide the nation with guaranteed security.  Throughout the entire history of the world, 
no nuclear state has ever been attacked by another nation.  North Korea often argues that 
Iraq would have not been invaded by the US if it carried nuclear weapons.
71
  It is afraid 
that it could be the next Iraq.  The North wishes to become a nuclear weapon state and 
protect and defend itself permanently from countries that possess not only nuclear 
weapons, but also powerful military forces. 
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 The second reason is because the weapons give the DPRK great bargaining power.  
North Korea presented the nuclear card during negotiations to receive economic benefits 
from other states.  The nuclear development has continuously brought in luxury goods for 
the leader, the Kim Family, living expenses for the government officials, and rice for the 
civilians.  In return, it was obligated to terminate the program.  Nuclear weapons, 
therefore, serve as a huge bargaining chip against nations that do not want to see North 
Korea as a nuclear state such as Japan, the US, and the ROK.
72
  
C. Current Status  
 There is one question that must be answered before moving forward.  How far has 
the DPRK developed its nuclear weapons program?  It seems like no one has the correct 
response to this puzzle except North Korea.  The question is important because it can 
identify the North as a nuclear state.  There is also a difference between a nuclear 
development program and nuclear weapons development.  The former program is aimed 
more towards generating nuclear energy.  It is necessary to find out precisely which area 
North Korea is presently concentrating on. 
2. NPT & IAEA 
A. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
a. The Treaty 
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was elected on 
July 1, 1968 and went into effect on March 5, 1970.  The overall purpose was to avoid a 
nuclear war and the great danger it could present to the general public.  After the World 
War II and during the Cold War, the number one priority of each state was national 
security.  Most countries desired to achieve this goal with a nuclear weapon.  The United 
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Nations (UN) disliked the idea and wished to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear technology through a legally binding multilateral commitment.  The movement 
was led by so-called Depository Governments, consisting of Russia, Northern Island, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom. 
Under the agreement, countries with nuclear weapons are obligated to discontinue 
further development, countries without such weapons should not attempt to acquire them, 
and all countries have the right to obtain peaceful nuclear energy. These three are the core 
concepts of the Treaty.  Each party is heavily monitored by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) for their cooperation to the Treaty and strict compliance to the 
conditions.
73
  The Treaty also upholds the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits 
all nuclear weapons tests (in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water) except 
underground. 
On May 11, 2005, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.  A total of one hundred 
ninety countries have joined the Treaty.  The countries include the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council (Council): China, Russia, France, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom.  Some notable countries that are non-parties to the Treaty are 
India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  The 
first three never signed the agreement and the DPRK withdrew in 2003. 
b. Articles 
 There are eleven articles in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Some of them are worth 
examining.  Article I fosters nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear explosive 
devices to non-nuclear-weapon states or help them manufacture nuclear weapons.  Article 
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II commands non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive any nuclear explosive devices or 
seek assistance to produce nuclear weapons.  Article III demands all parties to fulfill the 
IAEA’s safeguard system.  This clause is further explained in Article IV, which permits 
countries to function research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.  
The article also authorizes the exchange of scientific and technological information and 
materials for peaceful means. 
 Article VI commands nuclear disarmament and complete cessation of nuclear 
weapon manufacture.  Article VII promotes regional treaties that confirm the territory as 
a denuclearized zone.  Article VIII requests the parties to hold a conference every five 
years to ensure the operation of the NPT.  Article IX defines a nuclear-weapon state as a 
country that possessed nuclear explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967.  Lastly, Article 
X gives the parties their right to withdraw from the Treaty with three months advance 
notice served to all other countries and the UN Security Council. 
c. DPRK 
 On January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared that it was withdrawing from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and was no longer bound to the Safeguard Agreement it made with 
the IAEA.  North Korea joined the Treaty in 1985 as a non-nuclear-weapon state and 
became the first country ever to pull out from the pact.  The North had once in 1993 
stated its desire to remove itself from the NPT regime.  The US, however, engaged in a 
bilateral negotiation with the DPRK and enforced the country to change the plan just days 
before the withdrawal went into effect.
74
  The negotiation involved a promise from 
Washington to supply aid including oil shipments. 
                                                          
74 The United Nations, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml, accessed March, 2014. 
36 
 
 The withdrawal was chiefly due to the 9/11 terrorists attacks and US invasion of 
Iraq.  US President George W. Bush identified North Korea as an axis of evil, and US 
diplomacy towards the North was hostile.  The DPRK asserted that it felt threatened and 
saw a possible American military attack.  It said that it had to breach the disarmament 
agreement and strengthen its national security.  Under the international customary law 
doctrine, North Korea was expected to fulfill the good faith requirement and prove that 
the claimed US aggression put the country in actual danger.  The Non-Proliferation 




 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957.  The 
IAEA's core theme is famously known as "Atoms for Peace."
75
  Its main areas of works 
in the nuclear field are safety and security, science and technology, and safeguards and 
verification.  The Agency is an independent international organization and runs within 
the UN family.  It reports to the UN General Assembly annually and the Security Council 
on special occasions when it recognizes threats to global peace and security. 
 The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.  It has regional offices in Tokyo, 
Geneva, Toronto, and New York. It also has research centers and scientific laboratories in 
Italy and Monaco.  The Agency hires over 2,300 professionals and is led by Director 
General Yukiya Amano, a Japanese native who served at the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
for over thirty years.  Its financial resources are generated from the regular budget and 
voluntary contributions. 
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 As of November 2012, the IAEA has one hundred fifty eight member states.  It 
supports its members in five distinct nuclear subjects.  The Agency's Department of 
Nuclear Sciences and Applications helps countries apply nuclear techniques in 
agriculture, human health, water resource management, marine environment and 
industrial applications.  Its Department of Nuclear Energy promotes the safe use of 
nuclear power.  The Department of Nuclear Safety and Security works to prevent the 
harmful effects and possible damage of ionizing radiation on human beings and the 
environment.  One of the IAEA's most important sectors, the Department of Safeguards, 
relies on its inspectors to end the increase of nuclear arsenals.  Lastly, the Department of 
Technical Cooperation assists countries in enhancing nuclear technology. 
c. North Korea 
 On January 30, 1992, the DPRK signed an agreement with the IAEA in Vienna, 
Austria.  The agreement was largely based on the three focal features of the NPT.  North 
Korea consented not to build nuclear bombs and to attain them from another state.  It had 
to permit the IAEA personnel to inspect the facilities and show that no development 
existed.  The country was entitled to gain technology for nuclear power.  The agreement 
was thirty pages long and enclosed ninety-eight articles.  Every article was extremely 
precise and organized in a very detailed manner.  
3. Sanctions 
A. Sanction Types 
a. Asset Freeze 
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 There are a number of sanctions imposed on the DPRK.  Freezing of funds and 
economic resources is the major one.  Both organizations, the UN and the EU, designed a 
list called 'restrictions on admission'.  The list contains names of individuals and 35 
entities that international banks and financial institutions should not do business with.
76
  
From time to time, the organizations also request that the banks and institutions freeze the 
accounts that belong to North Korea, so that the nation is restricted from getting free 
access to its capital and funds that are linked to its nuclear program.  The other idea is to 
also stop its debt defaults and illicit activities including counterfeiting currency and 
laundering money.  If the banks and financial institutions did not follow these instructions, 
the organizations demanded the national governments to close down the institutions.  The 
banks and institutions are exempt from the regulation if they see the money is spent on 
humanitarian and development purposes or find clear evidence that the resources are not 
related to proliferation objectives. 
b. Financial Support 
 International banks and financial institutions are prohibited from offering 
financial assistance and concessional loans to the North.   The UN and EU member states 
also must closely watch the DPRK banks that are located within their territories.  This 
monitoring includes all payment records and transactions that are suspected to contribute 
to the country's nuclear weapon programs, as well as ballistic missile and weapons of 
mass destruction programs.  North Korea cannot open new banks or branches in the 
                                                          
76
 David Casa, "Imposing EU Sanctions on North Korea." The Malta Independent, April, 13, 2013. 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-04-13/opinions/imposing-eu-sanctions-on-north-korea-




member states.  Its banks cannot establish joint ventures and take ownership interest in 
global banks.  International banks also cannot start businesses in the North. 
c. Export & Import Restrictions 
 Any kind of arms trading with the DPRK is limited.  This includes not only the 
goods or equipment but also technology that could be utilized to develop nuclear and 
other weaponries.  Iran is one of the biggest trading partners of North Korea in terms of 
armory.  Both nations also sell military products to other countries.  They seem to find 
ways to make sales in the black market.  The UN and the EU member states cannot 
export gold, diamonds, precious metals, or other luxury products to North Korea.  The 
items are largely wanted by the upper-class citizens of the North.  Both organization 
sanctions, however, do not specify exactly which items are defined as luxury goods.  The 
exemption rule applies here as well and export items are qualified as long as they are for 
humanitarian aid. 
d. Shipping & Cargo Inspections 
 Shipping and air cargoes are a crucial portion of the DPRK economy.  This 
inspection requirement therefore impacts the nation considerably.  It is prohibited to sell, 
operate, lease, and insure North Korean vessels.  The member states have a right to 
inspect any North Korean ship if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the ship 
carries suspected items.  The vessel can be directed to the nearest port for careful 
inspection.  The North airline company must give pre-arrival and pre-departure 
information.  If vessels or airline carriers do not cooperate, the member states do not 
allow them to dock or land in their territories.  The transportation companies of the 
member states also do not attempt to deliver the prohibited items for the nation. 
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E. Restrictions on Admission & Residence 
 The UN and the EU member states do not allow entrance of DPRK people who 
are related to its weapon development practice.  This includes non-DPRK citizens who 
get paid and work under direction of the North Korea government.  This also includes 
diplomats of the North and the member states can reject based on clear evidence that the 
envoys are working to advance the weaponry.  The UN and the EU lists contain 29 
individuals and these people are banned from residing in the member states as well. 
6. Energy & Other Restrictive Measures 
 Teaching and training the DPRK nationals who could support the military system 
is another notable sanction.  Universities and educational institutions must carefully 
select its students to avoid any scientists and engineers who might help the weapon 
development in North Korea.   
 Both the UN and EU do not consider energy as one of the constraints imposed on 
the North.  Many experts believe that this should be included in the list since the nation is 
extremely vulnerable in this field and frequently experience energy shortages.  China is 
the largest importer of energy to the North.  It would be difficult to break this relationship.  
But, if the UN and the EU controls the energy trading to the DPRK, they would have a 




B. UN Security Council Resolutions 
a. Resolution 825 (1993) 
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 There are seven key UN Security Council resolutions that review North Korean 
issues.  The first one the Security Council discussed was the Resolution 825 on May 11, 
1993.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK delivered a written notification 
explaining its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.  It further notified its unwillingness to continue cooperating with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement.  It did not offer specific 
reasons for the withdrawal. 
 The Security Council was very concerned about the letter.  Until that point, North 
Korea had failed to fully comply with the Treaty and the IAEA could not completely 
inspect and verify any existence of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.  The 
Council encouraged the IAEA and all the Security Council members to influence the 
DPRK to terminate the notice and reaffirm its commitment to the safeguards agreement.
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b. Resolution 1695 (2006) 
 The Council adopted Resolution 1695 on July 15, 2006 and soon after the DPRK 
tested a series of ballistic missiles.  The action surprised most member states.  In 
September 2005, the Six Party Talks made a joint statement that North Korea plans to 
abandon all existing nuclear weapons and programs and return to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the IAEA safeguards agreement.  (The Six Party Talks was held for the fourth 
time in Beijing, China with participating diplomats from China, Japan, North and South 
Korea, Russia, and the United States.)
79
  In return, the parties promised to provide energy 
and economic assistance to the DPRK. 
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 The majority of the members condemned North Korea and agreed that the 
launches constituted a clear threat to international peace and security.  Japan was 
especially displeased with the fact that there was no adequate advance notice and the 
missiles landed near its territorial sea.  China and Russia, on the other hand, took the 
neutral stance and insisted that any aggressive reaction would aggravate tension and the 
situation should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations.  The two nations are 
usually very cautious when dealing with matters regarding the DPRK, because of their 
economic ties with the country.
80
  The spokesman of North Korea argued that the test was 
perfectly justified and conducted as a part of routine military exercises to increase its 
capacity for self-defense.  
 The Council sent a strong message to the DPRK and urged its immediate return to 
the Six Part Talks without any preconditions.  The Council members also decided to 
strictly prevent the transfer of missiles or missile-related equipment and technology to 
North Korea and the procurement of the same materials from the nation, as well as the 




c. Resolution 1718 (2006) 
 Just three month after the missile launch, the Security Council re-gathered on 
October 14, 2006 to talk about North Korea.  This time the main topic was even more 
devastating – nuclear testing.  On October 3
rd
, the DPRK foreign affairs representative 
made a statement of a possible nuclear testing.  The President of the Security Council 
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soon responded to the announcement and warned that the test, if carried out, would bring 
serious consequences.  Nonetheless, the North performed the test on October 9
th
.  
 Acting under the United Nations Charter Chapter VII Article 41, the Council on 
this occasion chose to impose sanctions on North Korea.  The article notes that, when a 
state causes harm to worldwide peace, the Council may select, as an alternative to the use 
of armed force, certain measures to resist the country’s inappropriate actions.
82
  The 
measures may well be economic restrictions. 
 The Council prohibited all member states to maintain trade relations with the 
DPRK.  It requested multinational financial institutions to freeze North Korean assets.  
There were, in addition, travel bans to the country and permission to inspect North 
Korean shipping cargoes. The Council emphasized that the constraints had exemptions 
and should not affect humanitarian needs.  It also established a committee to analyze the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and to make adjustments and toughen the restraints if 
necessary.  China again acted out of self-interest and had objection to the right to search 
clause.  
d. Resolution 1874 (2009) 
 The DPRK launched another missile on April 13, 2009.  The President of the 
Security Council made a statement that North Korea should avoid firing additional 
missiles and comply with Resolution 1718.
83
  On May 25
th
, the North conducted extra 
nuclear tests.  Resolution 1874 was formed in response on June 12
th
.  The resolution was 
an intensified version of Resolution 1718.  The goal was to tighten the sanctions 
proposed in 1718. 
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 Resolution 1874 allowed the member states to destroy the DPRK cargoes and 
vessels after careful inspection or in case there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the shipments may contain nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or other WMD.  
The resolution forbade any grants and financial assistance or concessional loans to North 
Korea, except for developmental aid that directly benefits civilian needs.  It created the 
Panel of Experts whose sole objective was to assist the Committee, which was set up 
during Resolution 1718, and to evaluate whether the sanctions were working properly.  It 
also advised the North to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
84
 
e. Recent Resolutions 
 Following 1874, there were six more resolutions that managed the DPRK 
problems: Resolution 1928 in June 2010, Resolution 1985 in June 2011, Resolution 2050 
in June 2012, Resolution 2087 in 2013, Resolution 2094 in 2013, and Resolution 2141 in 
2014.  Resolution 2087 and 2094 condemned the recent missile launch and nuclear test, 
and the other three resolutions extended the mandate of the Expert Panel, as it was 
designed to operate on an annual basis. The panel was required to oversee the status and 
file reports with their findings and recommendations. 
C. EU Sanctions 
 Sanctions have become the European Union's popular foreign-policy tool.  The 
EU is generally known as a soft power organization.  It has been, however, very 
aggressive with its sanctions.  The EU currently forces sanctions on 26 nations and some 
on particular terrorist groups, business entities and individuals.  The total number of 
sanctions increased from 22 in 2010 to 69 in 2011.
85
  Most sanctions are directed at Syria, 
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Iran, Libya, Burma, and the DPRK.  The rise of sanction implementation indicates that 
the EU is now more involved in world affairs than previous years.  The organization has 
recently been updating the old sanctions to fit today's environment.  
 The increase also deleted the soft image of the EU.  It uses restrictions to cause 
damages to the target and prevent it from taking a certain action and follow the common 
international norm.  The targeted country or group usually violates the value and the 
mission of the EU and the security of the global community.  The first one is called 
'democracy sanctions' and the latter is named 'security sanctions'.  The EU applies the 
democracy sanctions when nations violate international human rights or when countries 
should adopt more of democratic governance.  For example, the EU imposed sanctions 
on Uzbekistan following the Andijan massacre.  It also has relied on the security 
sanctions to discourage actions that could cause serious consequences in the worldwide 
community.  North Korean weapon development is the perfect case. 
 The EU sanctions on the North go hand-in-hand with the UN Security Council 
Resolutions.  They are both very identical to one another.  The EU sanctions frequently 
mentions the UNSC Resolutions and pretty much follows the UN Resolutions. The major 
difference is the listed individuals and entities that the member states should be aware of 
and should not do business with unless the matters are related to humanitarian aid.  The 
table below lists all EU constraints imposed on the DPRK.  They all deal with armory 
and are categorized as security sanctions. 
 
Table 2: EU Sanctions on North Korea (European Union) 
Sanction Title Sanction Number Date Cause Type 
Council Common 
Position 
2006/795/CFSP 11/20/2006 Missile Launch New 
Council Regulation 329/2007 03/27/2007 Nuclear Test New 
















689/2009 07/29/2009 Nuclear Test 
Amendment 
329/2007 
Council Regulation 1283/2009 12/22/2009 Nuclear Test 
Amendment 
329/2007 
Council Decision 2009/1002/CFSP 12/22/2009 









1251/2010 12/22/2010 Nuclear Test 
Amendment 
329/2007 
Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP 12/22/2010 




Council Decision 2011/860/CFSP 12/19/2011 







1355/2011 12/20/11 Nuclear Test 
Amendment 
329/2007 
Council Decision 2013/88/CFSP 02/18/2013 
New Nuclear Test 







137/2013 02/18/2013 Nuclear Test 
Amendment 
329/2007 










C. Effectiveness of Sanctions 
 The number of sanctions for the UN and the EU is continually growing.  The 
aftermath of implementation is, however, the total opposite story.  It is hard to measure 
the effectiveness of sanctions and so little has been done to evaluate the sanctions.  Some 
research and studies have been conducted in academia, but the EU and other international 
organizations have not done enough to calculate the effectiveness of sanctions they 
imposed.  The academia has often recommended enhanced planning, monitoring and 
reporting.  The cooperation and coordination among sanction committees, expert panels, 
and monitoring bodies are another key element.  There is also a need of a sanction 
47 
 
coordinator and a special advisor.  The EU, however, does not have this system in place.  
Monitoring is done most of time by the general law-enforcement agencies of the member 
states.  It is thus difficult to conclude that the sanctions are reaching the intended 
objectives.  They are for sure causing damages, but many steps have to be taken in order 
to be certain that the sanctions affect the right target. 
 The success of a sanction should not be judged based on its impact on the 
economy of the targeted state.  Instead it should be measured based on the state's change 
in behavior.  The EU sanctions on the DPRK have affected the country by making it lose 
millions of dollars.  The sanctions, however, have failed to finish the weapon 
development.  The intended nation must know that its compliance would lift the sanctions.  
But, this goal is almost impossible to accomplish since many different organizations 
employ separate sanctions on that particular state.
 86
   It is therefore important to unify 
sanctions among the global institutions and nations.  The constraints are also too 
inflexible.  When there is a necessary for amendment of sanctions, it is often too complex 
to make changes.  Sanctions must also be accompanied by diplomacy.  The UN and the 
EU cannot impose sanctions on North Korea and leave out their foreign relations 
responsibilities. The organizations must continually attempt to put the North into a 
negotiating position. 
 Sanctions to freeze foreign bank accounts are being imposed as smart sanctions.
87
  
This way the economic constraints would not affect the general public.  But it is uncertain 
whether the smart sanctions are working properly and not negatively influencing the 
citizens.  No nation and global institution can obtain accurate data from North Korea to 
                                                          
86
 Victor Cha., Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. (New York: Columbia 





make this judgment.  A recent study found that only one third of sanctions are operating 
efficiently. While another stated that almost all sanctions do not reach the intended 
objectives.  These studies are inaccurate for the same reason: It is not easy to gain access 
to the DPRK information system and gather the necessary data to draw up an analysis.  
Some claim that there may be no data available but there may certainly be reactions.  And 
they believe such reactions can replace data and give feedback.  In order to make the 
right decision, however, it is obvious that the data must be accurate and abundant. 
 Each state has its own distinct interests and that is the norm of the international 
relations.  China, however, is too often a barrier when the international community tries 
to utilize sanctions on North Korea.
88
  China has a close relationship with the North.  
Their relations go back to the Korean War.  They fought together against the ROK and 
the US.  China also wishes to take advantage of their trading alliance with the DPRK.  
Currently, China remains the sole commercial partner of North Korea.  The nation is 
constantly creating problems by disagreeing with the UN and the EU sanctions and 
almost always taking the side of the North. 
D. Sanction Monitoring 
a. Unification 
 The most necessary change that must be made is monitoring of the 
implementation and impact of EU sanctions.  Again, the EU presently has no sanction 
monitoring system in place.  It is also true that each member state has different opinions 
on imposing sanctions and different levels of monitoring capability.  Some members 
cannot afford the time, effort and funding on sanction monitoring.  So, it is time to put the 
self-interest of each state aside and unify the common EU sanction monitoring practice.  





To this date, the organization should impose only sanctions that can be monitored.  
Otherwise, the restraints that are not monitored may bring undesired results back to the 
EU.  So, in a nutshell, the EU needs to customize, target and evaluate all of its sanctions. 
b. Realistic Sanctions 
 The EU must set goals that both the institution and the targeted nation can both 
reach.  In other words, the EU cannot ask too much from the country.  The request must 
be something that the state can fulfill.  Sanctions are another tool for negotiation.  When 
each negotiating party is requiring too much from the opposite end, the deal cannot be 
made.  The restraints cannot be too broad either.  The EU must suggest clearly what it 
wants the target nation to do.  In short, it must set realistic goals.  The DPRK, for instance, 
will not bother with something it cannot accomplish.   
c. Reward for Compliance 
 A study points out that a threat to employ further sanctions on a nation does less 
good than a promise to loosen or suspend the existing ones.  It is therefore better to go 
with a large sanction package that contains detailed description of each sanction than to 
start with a small one and keep on adding on to the list.  There has to be a rewards 
program.  And, the target country must understand how to take advantage of the program.  
It must be aware with the fulfillments and their rewards.   
d. Communication 
 It is difficult in the case of the DPRK, but the EU must try to communicate with 
the public of the target state.  It should explain the reasons for the imposition of sanctions 
and the nature of sanctions and the conditions attached to them.  This is because the 
citizens can force the government to comply with the requests. The EU would explain to 
50 
 
the people that the consequences of its government’s actions.  It must clearly specify 
what the conditions are.  
4. 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework & Six Party Talks 
A. Agreed Framework 
a. Background 
 The Agreed Framework (Framework) was adopted in Geneva on October 21, 
1994, after a few months of bilateral meetings between the US and the DPRK.  The 
former American President Jimmy Carter began the first discussion with North Korea 
during his trip to the nation's capital, Pyongyang.  President Carter met with its leader 
Kim Il Sung and opened diplomatic negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
crisis.  The following series of encounters were difficult but highly valuable as both sides 
reached an accord to create the nuclear-weapon-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula.  The 
North further consented to following the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement and its 
requirement for peaceful use of nuclear energy.  
b. Agreements 
 The Framework consists of four articles.  The first one indicates that the DPRK's 
graphite-moderated reactors and related complexes will be replaced by light-water reactor 
(LWR) power plants.  The US should help organize an international consortium to 
finance this project.  America also agreed to arrange interim energy alternatives and 
provide heavy oil until the completion of the LWR units. 
 The second article specifies that the two nations will form political and economic 
relations.  They should reduce barriers to trade and investment including controls on 
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telecommunication services and financial transactions.  Furthermore, they planned to 
open an embassy in each other's respective capital cities.   
 Pursuant to Article Three, the DPRK was required to maintain peace and security 
on the Korean Peninsula.  In return, the US assured not to use nuclear weapons against 
North Korea.  In Article IV, the North pledged to remain as a member of the IAEA, 
rejoin the NPT and accept the Safeguards Agreement which included facility inspections.  
c.  Results 
 Some international affairs experts criticize the US for being too soft with the 
Framework and yielding too much to the DPRK.
89
  Most people, however, believe that 
the agreement produced significant outcomes for the two parties and the international 
community.  Most notably, America was able to put together a global consortium and 
supply the DPRK with two LWRs while successfully delivering heavy oil for alternative 
energy prior to the construction of the reactors.  This large consortium project was 
managed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).  In 
March 1995 national representatives of Japan, the US, and the ROK gathered in New 
York City to kick off the KEDO.  The main priority of the KEDO, an international non-
profit organization, was to efficiently execute Article I of the Framework.  South Korea 
also played an important role in the project as one of its businesses, the Korean Electric 
Power Corp., was selected as the main contractor. 
 Although there were some delays, America productively carried out the other 
Articles.  The Framework was effective for several years.  The US and the DPRK kept a 
peaceful relationship and were heading towards a positive direction.  The aggressive 
                                                          
89
 Ralph A. Cossa, “The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: Is It Still Viable? Is It Enough?,” Pacific Forum 
CSIS (1999): 28 
52 
 
foreign policy by the Bush administration and the terrorist attacks in 2001, however, 
facilitated a drastic change and caused North Korea to reconsider the nuclear 
development issue. 
B. Six-Party Talks 
a. Background 
 Soon after the US invasion of Iraq, the American Ambassador to the ROK 
Thomas Hubbard affirmed that the US policy towards the DPRK would be dissimilar to 
the Iraq case.  Such verification eased the growing intensity between the two nations, and 
North Korea showed its interest in founding new multilateral meetings.  China, America, 
and the North met in Beijing in April 2003 and formulated the trilateral talks.  The US 
asked China to persuade the DPRK to dismantle the nuclear weapons system.  North 
Korea desired a legally binding non-aggression pact with America in exchange for the 
disarmament.   The parties could not come up with a settlement, but approved to further 
extend the meetings and also demanded involvement of other major parties including the 
ROK, Japan and Russia.  This was the start of the Six-Party Talks which necessitated 
long-lasting and painstaking negotiations with the most difficult and unpredictable nation 
around the globe.  The Six-Party Talks began in August 2003 and ended in September 
2007, consisting of six total rounds of discussions and 11 separate meeting phases.  They 
all took place in Beijing.  
b. Main Contentions 
 The primary topic was the DPRK nuclear weapons advancement.  The main 
participants were the US and North Korea.  The North wished to reconstruct diplomatic 
relations with America and receive economic rewards for its disarmament.  Specifically, 
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the DPRK first needed the US and President Bush to conclude the hard-line policy 
towards the nation.  Second, it sought a legally binding non-aggression treaty that could 
guarantee security from a possible American attack.  Lastly, the country would invite the 
IAEA inspectors if the conditions were satisfied.  Unlike the Clinton era, however, the 
US was indecisive with its reactions to the DPRK's verifiable and irreversible 
disarmament.  It could not trust the nation and did not take the promises seriously based 





 There were six nations involved in the gathering.  Each country participated with 
different interests and reasons.  China was the host of the Six-Party Talks as all meetings 
occurred in Beijing.  It also acted as a mediator since it had close political relations with 
the DPRK.  It had developed economic ties with the nation and was a rare trading partner.  
It also provided North Korea with an enormous amount of humanitarian and energy 
assistance.  Another cause was its intention to raise its power in the Northeast Asia region.  
China consistently wished to reduce the American presence and military influence in the 
area.  One way to accomplish this goal was to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula 
which could result in withdrawal of American troops from the ROK and Japan.  It also 
wanted to prevent further development of the US-Japan military coalition.  Both China 
and Japan continuously desired its own military dominance in this territory. 
 China needed a stable and peaceful neighborhood during its modernization 
process.  The political stability in Northeast Asia thus was a vital matter for its economic 
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enhancement.  China also had a crucial commercial relationship with the ROK as the 
advanced technology imports from South Korea were critical to China's long-term 
economic prosperity.  Finally, the number of North Korean defectors was constantly 
rising, and the issue was a concern to a nation which was already overcrowded.  In a 
nutshell, China was committed to helping the North but not to the extent where it had to 
sacrifice its own political interests and economic needs.   
- DPRK 
 North Korea was seeking to achieve three objectives from the Six-Party Talks.  
The largest reason the North had to acquire nuclear arsenals was for national security.  If 
the nation had to give up its weapons, it needed to secure a guaranteed non-aggression 
pact with the US.  It wanted to complete this deal at the Six-Party Talks.  Energy was on 
the agenda.  The country needed a continuous supply of oil and additional constructions 
of LWRs.  Third, economic incentives were also an important negotiating term.  The 
DPRK suffered multiple famines during the last two decades and lost a great portion of 
its population due to food shortage and poverty.  North Korea was desperate to receive 
economic aid from the global community. 
-  Japan  
 The DPRK did not wish Japan to join the Six-Party Talks.  They never built good 
relations due to Japan's occupancy of Korea for over three decades.  In fact, numerous 
North Korean leaders fought against Japanese during the colonial period.  Not only did 
the US, however, push for Japan's participation but also Japan had a massive assistance 
package that the DPRK could not ignore. The number one priority for Japan during the 
meetings was to return its citizens who had been abducted by North Korea.  Over the 
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years, the North kidnapped citizens of other nation states to obtain information and train 
its diplomats and secret agents (spies) before sending them abroad.  This abduction issue 
frequently disturbed the progress of the Six-Party Talks.  Japan desired to settle the 
problem before moving onto any negotiation, and the subject matter seemed to be of too 
little connection to the DPRK's disarmament.  The Japanese economic impact, however, 
was too great, and the success of the Talks depended heavily on Japan's financial 
contributions.  Secondly, security was a huge concern to Japan.  North Korea was 
prepared to launch countless long-distance missiles targeted at Japan's largest cities.  
Japan also worried that China might gain too much power in the region, which could 
reduce its status and control in the area.   
- Russia 
 Russia's interest to join the Six-Party Talks was the most straightforward one.  
Firstly, the nation wanted its businesses to become the primary contractor for the 
construction of nuclear power plants and other related facilities in the DPRK.  Secondly, 
it wished to continuously utilize North Korean territory as the main trade route with the 
ROK.  This railroad export and import route saved tremendous amounts of money 
compared to airways and shipment cargo deliveries.   
- ROK 
 The ROK's intentions were pretty obvious.  It needed to create stability on the 
Korean Peninsula.  Too often, foreign financial institutions were hesitant to make 
investments in South Korea because of the nuclear dilemma.  Many multinational 
corporations also left Seoul over the years for the same reason.  In addition, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall presented the South with hope and possibility for its own unification.  For the 
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past decade, the ROK policy on the DPRK has been the use of economic engagement to 
reduce tensions and induce reforms.  Two presidential summits held in Pyongyang and 
the recent construction of Kaesong Industrial Zone may bring the impossible dream into 
fruition.  South Korea must keep on knocking on the door to find the right moment to 
unify with the North under mutually agreeable conditions.   
- US 
 For a number of years, the US had attempted to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear technology and materials to both nation states and non-state actors.  This effort 
has been carried out not only in the Northeast Asia region but also throughout the world.  
Each case required distinguished negotiation strategies and planning.  Each was tough 
and stressful.  The nonproliferation endeavor, however, had worked very effectively thus 
far.  Currently, less than ten countries possess nuclear warheads.  The new challenge for 
America was in the non-state actors and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  The weapons 
could possibly somehow end up in the hands of the terrorists and be used against the US 
and other developed societies.  Another reason to be a major player in the Six-Party Talks 
was its longtime commitment to defend South Korea in accordance with the Mutual 
Security Agreement of 1953. 
d. Results 
 Compared to the 1993 Geneva Agreed Framework, the scale of the Six-Party 
Talks was much bigger.  The exact comparison of the outcome therefore cannot be 
measured.  The Talks certainly had ups and downs.  They produced many dissatisfactions 





  The meetings were concluded in 2007.  The nations had promised 
for the 7th round, but the DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il became ill.  The country was going 
through a leadership change.  It conducted a series of nuclear experiments and tested 
long-distance missiles on a several occasions.  And, it performed military attacks on the 
ROK and took lives of innocent individuals.   
 That was the key difference from the previous negotiation, where the US and the 
DPRK came up with a settlement at the Framework.  Regardless, the Talks offered a 
forum for all parties to exchange their positions and proposals.  The parties also agreed 
that they were committed to resolving the nuclear dispute through peaceful means and 
dialogue.  The Six-Party Talks were successful largely due to the fact that more than one 
nation (America) was involved in trying to convince North Korea to abandon the 




In order to have the DPRK voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons system, the 
US has to change its diplomatic policy.  The 1994 Agreed Framework is considered as a 
success case and the Six-Party Talks is viewed as a total failure because there was a 
binding settlement in Geneva and none in Beijing.  The key distinction between the two 
can be found from the American negotiation strategy.  The Clinton administration 
worked with North Korea to settle the dispute, whereas the Bush administration simply 
ordered the North what to do.  Prior to any security guarantee or economic aid, President 
Bush told the nation to eliminate the weapons in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible” 
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  The DPRK desired a legally binding non-aggression pact before discussing the 
disarmament.  Both sides were looking at each other and waiting for the opposition to 
drop the weapon first.  This situation normally occurs when there is no trust between the 
parties.  The host country China and the other nations also could not persuade either side 
to act before the other.  For several years, the parties tried to figure out this issue - who 
would go first - when the Geneva case was settled within a year.   
There was not much difference between the Framework and the Talks.  The 
asking elements were the same: security, assistance and disarmament.  It was about 
applying the right plans and schemes to bring out the desire results.  Unless the US is first 
to display room for negotiation, the North Korean nuclear dispute will be hard to improve 
in the foreseeable future.  
 There are alternative solutions available to satisfy these needs.  Instead of a less 
formal written assurance, the US can make a legally binding non-aggression pact which 
avoids a possible American attack.  Other nations are also ready to supply financial 
assistance packages that can have a huge impact on the DPRK economy.  No country 
gains from the development of nuclear bombs in North Korea.  Many states, however, 
will benefit from a liberalized DPRK.  Some experts worry that the North will secretly 
progress the nuclear program while taking these incentives.  Under the IAEA surveillance 
and its Safeguards regime and the inspection requirement, such a task is almost 
impossible to accomplish. 
 The next Six-Party Talks can bring different results and finish the nuclear dispute.  
The US must first restructure its mindset and embrace the methods used in the Agreed 
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Framework where President Clinton applied a soft power theory.  President Bush 
preferred the complete opposite tactic.  The current American President, Barack Obama, 
is stuck in between, trying both carrot and stick.  Only the carrot will get the job done.  
When the strong side negotiates with the weak side, the strong must take two steps 
backwards first and make the weak take one step forward.  The timing is perfect to 
present new offers.  The DPRK is now struggling under a new leadership.  One of its 
closest allies, Iran, has decided to switch its defense policy.  It is time for the US 
President to send another letter to the leader of North Korea and rewrite history.  
5. Human Rights Violations - Prison Camps 
A. The Issue 
 The DPRK is currently violating a number of human rights laws.  To identify a 
few: labor rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, 
freedom of press, minority rights, right to food, forced prostitution, forced abortion, and 
right to a fair trial.
94
  North Korean prison camps and violations against the prisoners are 
one of the major ones.  The issue has become a popular discussion topic around the globe.  
As the North does not provide any information on its prison system, the available facts 
are very limited.  Numerous former detainees, however, have successfully escaped the 
country and testified about their time in the camps.  Scholars, the media, international 
institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) have discovered adequate 
information from the testimonies and produced reports about the camps.   
B. Kwan-Li-So 
a. Prisoners 
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 The kwan-li-so labor camps are to imprison social, political, economic or 
ideological deviants who are considered a risk to the DPRK.  To be more specific, 
persons suspected of wrong-doing, wrong-thinking, wrong-knowledge, wrong-
association, or wrong-class-background are captive in the camps.   
 Wrong-doing may include skipping too many mandatory ideological education 
classes, failing to take good care of photographic images of the leaders - Kim Il Sung and 
Kim Jong Il, making complaints about living conditions, criticizing regime policies, 
travelling without permission, or interacting with South Koreans while travelling outside 
the nation.  Wrong-thinking can be supporting ideas that go against the official ideology, 
which includes any religious beliefs that counter the main philosophy.  Wrong-
knowledge can be applied to North Korean students or diplomats who lived in foreign 
nations and returned to the country after their duties.  The North believes they may pose a 
danger to its population since they had been exposed to capital prosperity, democracy and 
civil liberties.  Wrong-association is being part of a family whose family members had 
been involved in Japan's occupation of Korea or supported the Republic of Korea during 
the Korean War.  And, lastly, wrong-class includes those who kept close relations with 
the Japanese government during Japan's colonial days.  It is known that South Korean 
and other foreign war prisoners from the Korean War and the Vietnam War are also 
incarcerated in these camps.  
b. System 
 There are six kwan-li-so prison camps and they are all large facilities.  They are 
located in the mountains and mostly in the northern part of the DPRK.  The total number 
of prisoners is estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000, and there are about 5,000 to 
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50,000 prisoners per camp.
 95
  The outer perimeters of the prisons are surrounded by 
barbed-wire fences, heavily guarded by armed guards.  Some detainees are incarcerated 
in a single cell and some are in larger units as a group or with family members.   
 At most times, the offending political prisoner is not the only one who is confined.  
His or her parents, children and sometimes grandchildren are imprisoned as well.  The 
past leader, Kim Il Sung strongly believed in this three generation penalty practice.  Such 
guilt-by-association was a common procedure in Korean history, which was discontinued 
after the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1897) but revived again during the Kim Il Sung era.   
 Often times, people put in the camps are arrested and charged for no particular 
criminal offense.  They are definitely not tried in any sort of judicial process.  They do 
not have the opportunity to appear before a judge, confront the accusers, offer a defense, 
or hire a legal counsel.  The presumed offenders are one day taken to an interrogation 
complex and tortured to confess. They disappear all of a sudden and without notifying 
their families, friends, and coworkers.  Such an act, forced disappearance with arbitrary 
detention and execution, is a clear violation of the international human rights and a 
modern day phenomena of repression.  Notably, The Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners was elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations General Assembly to set out a good principle of the treatment of prisoners and 
the management of institutions.  The DPRK prison system completely disobeys these 
global norms and standards.   
c. Main Problems 
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 The most severe troubles of the DPRK prison camps are below-substance food 
rations and hard labor.  Due to the food shortage, the prisoners often choose to eat plants, 
grass, bark, rats, or snakes.  Starvation is not only jeopardizing the lives of inmates but is 
also a national crisis and the majority of its citizens are suffering from hunger.  
 The kwan-li-so camps require hard labor.  The detainees are used in producing 
mining coal, iron, gold, and other ores.  Farming and manufacturing duties are also very 
common.  The prisoners work twelve hours a day and seven days per week.  They have 
one rest day per month and celebrate three holidays per year.  They are assigned with 
daily production quotas and punished if they fail to fulfill their parts.  They receive a very 
small amount of money for their labor and a small meal per day.  They are also given 
extremely thin clothes to go through the entire cold winter season.  Shoes but no socks 
are provided.  Common physical symptoms and illnesses among the inmates are 
insufficient protein and calcium in the diet, hunched backs, frostbite, and missing toes, 
fingers, hands, arms, or legs from work accidents.
96
  There are no doctors or adequate 
medicine to treat the injuries.  
 For these reasons, death rates are extremely high in kwan-li-so.  Most of the 
detainees die in prison with sickness or disease and some of them commit suicide.  These 
inhumane conditions are often compared to the Soviet Union concentration camps and 
even the Holocaust.   
d. Execution and Punishments 
 Those who violate the camp regulations are put into special detention cells.  They 
are beaten and tortured and die soon after being released.  They are punished for various 
causes: stealing, unauthorized eating, and failure to meet production quotas, damaging 





camp facilities, complaining, or sexual conduct between prisoners.  Escape attempts are 
punished by execution.  The executions are performed while other inmates are watching 
from a close range.  Some of the detainees witnessing the executions cry out in distress 
and some are forced to throw stones at or strike the corpse.   
 As sexual relations are prohibited, young female inmates who become pregnant 
are harshly punished.  They are taken away by the guards and often not seen again. 
Sexual exploitation of young women is although very common.  These women, in 
exchange for sexual favors, receive additional food and less intense work such as record 
keeping or cleaning guard offices.  The current international human rights law clearly 
indicates that sex between prisoners and prison guards constitute rape.  
e. Release 
 Official reported releases occur twice a year from only select camps.  Those 
extraordinary days are on the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.  A minor 
ceremony is conducted to pledge the appreciation and loyalty to the regime.  The released 
individuals are sworn to secrecy, promising not to disclose insights of the camps.  
Although, a study found that the most North Koreans are well aware of the existence of 





 Kyo-hwa-so may be translated from Korean as "a place to make a good person 
through education."  The term is also utilized in the ROK, and it can also be translated as 
a "reeducation, enlightenment, re-socialization or edification center."  The DPRK has 





kyo-hwa-so in every province.  The prisons hold political detainees and people convicted 
of criminal offenses.  They are known to be brutal labor prison camps.  
b. System 
 The kyo-hwa-so camps, consists of several buildings that are surrounded by high 
walls, electrified-wire fencing, and guard towers.  Each cell is extremely small and 
overcrowded.  The education component of the imprisonment is repeatedly memorizing 
Kim Il Sung public speeches and editorials which emphasize the regimes' priorities, as 
well as organized self-criticism sessions.  During these sessions, inmates often confess 
crimes that they did not commit and ask for forgiveness.   
 Kyo-haw-so, similar to kwan-li-so, mandates hard labor while providing below-
subsistence-level food provisions.  These circumstances consistently cause weight-loss, 
industrial accidents, malnutrition-related diseases, and death.  Again, medical doctors and 
medications are rarely available.  Many detainees, therefore, die in prison and before the 
completion of their sentences.   
c. Kwan-li-so v. Kyo-hwa-so 
 There are some differences between the two discussed prison camps.  Kwan-li-so 
confine only the political wrongdoers.  Whereas, Kyo-hwa-so contain people with both 
criminal and political convictions.  At kyo-hwa-so, there is no custody policy of the 
convict's family members.  The kyo-hwa-so detainees are found guilty after going 
through the judicial process and given a fixed term sentence. Their imprisonment is also 
not in secrecy as their families and friends know exactly which camp center they are 
incarcerated at and why.  In a nutshell, kyo-hwa-so are correctional facilities for persons 
with serious criminal backgrounds or who committed felony level crimes. 
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 Another unique group that is captivated at kyo-hwa-so is those who have been 
repatriated from China.  They end up at the prisons often without trial and beaten and 
tortured by the prison guards.  Repatriation is considered as a heavy crime and treated 
critically in the DPRK.  
D. Human Rights Violations 
a. International Standards and Norms 
 The DPRK prison camps violate various international human rights standards: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Rome Statute of the international Criminal 
Court, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
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In particular, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court should be examined 
since the camps significantly challenge the definition of "crimes against humanity."  The 
term "crimes against humanity" covers the topics of murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation or forcible population transfer; imprisonment or severe deprivations of 
physical liberty, torture, rape or sexual slavery; persecution on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, gender or religious grounds; enforced disappearances; apartheid.  The 
Rome Statute has been signed by 139 UN Member States and ratified by 117 members.   
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
ARTICLE 7 
 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 





d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
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g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, … or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; 
i. Enforced disappearance of person; 
j. The crime of apartheid; 
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
 
Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Rome, Italy. Entered into force June 2002. 
 
b. "Gross Violations"  
 There are a number of other violations involved in North Korean prison camps.  
The sudden disappearances and no available information regarding their whereabouts 
take away the physical liberty.  The deportations and subsequent imprisonments happen 
without any judicial procedures.  Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) verifies that suspected offenders have the right to judicial 
proceedings conducted in accordance with due process and fair trial.  Article 9 identifies 
that no one should be subject to arbitrary arrest.  The incarceration of the family members 
of the detainees is a violation of Article 26 - right to equal protection and non-
discrimination, including on grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status.  
The insufficient food supply and hard labor disobeys Article 10, which necessitates 
people deprived from liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for inherent 
dignity.  More specifically, Article 8 directly forbids forced or compulsory labor.  Under 
Article 11, sovereign states also need to offer adequate food to prisoners, as well as 
present the right to freedom from hunger.   
 The executions in the prisons go against Article 6 of the ICCPR, which entails the 
inherent right to life.  The article further instructs that the death penalty must be carried 
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out with a final judgment rendered by a competent court.  Beatings and torture performed 
by the prison guards are banned by Article 7.  The additional harassments that follow the 
executions contravene the terminology in Article 7 - other inhumane act.  The detainees 
who watch the executions and are forced to abuse the corpse suffer from great injury to 
mental health.  
 The International Criminal Court Statute highlights the crime against humanity of 
extermination, and the high numbers of deaths in detention are a clear violation.  The 
forced abortion and the three generation guilty-by-association practices are as well a part 
of the crime against humanity of extermination clause.  The punishments for repatriation 
are also considered as a crime against humanity of extermination. 
Fundamental Rules of International Law 
 
Articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights violated in North Korea’s political 
penal labor colonies: 
 
Article 6 (right to life); 
Article 7 (right not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment); 
Article 8 (right not to be held in slavery or servitude); 
Article 9 (right not be held in arbitrary detention): 
Article 10 (right for all persons deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity); 
Article 12 (right to free movement); 
Article 16 (right to recognition as a person before the law); 
Article 17 (right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with privacy, family, 
home or correspondence); 
Article 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion); 
Article 19 (right to hold opinion without interference); 
Article 21 (right to peaceable assembly); 
Article 22 (right to freedom of association); 
Article 26 (rights to equal protection and non-discrimination, including on 
grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status.) 
 
E. Recommendations 
a. UN Members States 
 At the United Nations Human Rights Council and General Assembly, the member 
states can vote for the resolutions on the DPRK human rights impasse.  This should 
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include establishing a commission of inquiry and a panel of experts whose task is to 
oversee the situation and write UN reports to publicize and stress the seriousness of the 
crisis.  This effort would make it more difficult for North Korea to deny the existence of 
the prison camps and pressure the nation to make proper changes.  The commission and 
the panel should principally question the applicability of the responsibility to protect 
doctrine.  The UN sees its responsibility to protect citizens when their own governments 
fail to do so and they are subjected to the crimes against humanity.  The member states 
that maintain diplomatic relations with the North can also play a major role.  They may 
propose that they are willing to discontinue the relationship unless the DPRK improves 
the human rights violations.   
b. China 
 China is in a unique position whenever the international community attempts to 
discuss the DPRK issues.  It is a father figure to North Korea and always tries to protect 
the country from outside pressure, especially at the UN Security Council gatherings.  The 
reason behind this is due to their close relations in history and their current close trade 
ties.  In terms of the human rights violations in the North, China should cease the 
repatriation of North Koreans back to the DPRK.  This especially includes aged people, 
women and children.  When these persons are forced to return to the North, they are 
mostly executed or beaten and tortured in the prison camps for the rest of their lives.   
 China must also allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
interview the North Koreans hiding in the nation.  The UNHCR should have the authority 
to examine those who would face immediate danger upon their return to the DPRK and 
find appropriate solutions.  Noting that China already agreed to and signed the Refugee 
69 
 
Convention, it has to give out citizenships to North Korean refugees and permit these 
individual to settle and make adequate living in China.  
c. ROK, US and Japan 
 When the Six-Party Talks resume, the human rights problems must be discussed 
followed by the security and economic matters.  Usually, the parties gather with the 
common goal of resisting the DPRK nuclear weapon development program by offering 
both financial and economic incentives.  The human rights violations are another agenda 
that must be included and the parties should attempt to find ways to resolve the issue at 
these meetings.  The ROK, the US and Japan can also continue to provide asylum, 
residence and citizenship to North Koreans who successfully escape the country.  This 
should include some assistance in adjusting to a new culture and living environment as 
most of these people struggle to find jobs in new countries and survive in new life 
settings.   
6. Human Rights Violations - Defectors 
A. The Issue 
 The issue on the DPRK defectors is becoming a critical concern for many nations, 
international agencies, and human rights groups.  The key reason is that the number of 
defectors is on the rise.  There are over 100,000 defectors residing in China.
99
  Almost 
3,000 defectors have been entering the ROK annually during recent years.
100
  This is a 
100% increase from the early 2000s.
101
  Many also wish to go to other developed 
countries such as the US and Western Europe.  
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 Choosing to leave one’s country is a difficult decision to make.  To escape a 
nation like North Korea is another challenging process.  Settling down and making 
lifestyle adjustments in other countries are also demanding and stressful for the defectors.  
Most states welcome the North Korean defectors.  They offer various programs and 
financial support to help them.  China, however, returns the defectors to the North.  It 
does not classify them as refugees or asylum seekers and does not provide citizenship 
opportunity.   
B. Reasons 
a. Economical 
 Most North Korean defectors leave their nation for economic reasons.  They flee 
to search for employment and make a living outside the country.  These economic 
defectors have no intention to return home in the foreseeable future, not until the nation's 
economic situation makes progress.   
 The number of economic defectors has been consistently high during the two 
decades.  Since its first leader Kim Il Sung's death in 1994, the DPRK economy has been 
in recession.  The economic system has deteriorated since this time.  Both production and 
consumption have fallen.  Various economic stimulus plans have constantly failed.  Its 
economic growth rate was below par during most of the 1990s.  The rate was barely 
above zero during the 2000s.  The public food distribution was disrupted on many 
occasions.  North Korea also suffered a severe famine in the 1990s.  Over 1 million 
individuals lost their lives due to starvation and 200,000 to 300,000 of its citizens escaped 
the nation during this time.
102
  Today, many people in the North engage in informal 
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trading and private cultivation.  Numerous free markets or the so-called farmers markets 
and even black markets also operate in the country, which violate its national laws.  If the 
DPRK continues to focus on its military and spend most of its budget on defense, a 
sudden economic recovery is almost impossible.  It can be therefore easily predicted that 
the number of economic defectors from the North will remain high over the next several 
years. 
b. Political 
 Defectors also flee for political reasons.  North Koreans who have visited other 
nations, people who witnessed the outside world through the Internet, and those who 
heard about the developed world from foreigners attempt to leave their country simply 
for a better life.  The North still functions under the communist doctrine.  The 
government has complete control over its citizens.  Both politically and economically, 
individuals do not enjoy much freedom and the fundamental legal rights which are often 
widely available in most countries.   
This is one of the main reasons the DPRK is cautious to open its borders for both 
leisure and business.  Travelling requires significant interactions.  When the citizens of a 
nation network with foreigners, they are exposed to new ideas, values and beliefs.  They 
make improvements from these new views and regularly seek for betterment.  When this 
desire becomes larger, people reach out to the outside world at a greater scale.  The 
Internet also brings the international community a lot closer.  People can find fault with 
its system and government through new technologies. North Koreans accordingly would 
want to take the risk to be a part of a liberalized society and have a brighter future.  The 




 There are also simple cross-borders who leave home on a temporary basis for 
work or a family visit.  A number of North Koreans engage in border commerce with the 
Chinese.   They usually trade Korean food and forest products with processed food and 
consumer goods manufactured in China.  North Koreans also have family members and 
relatives living in China.  They are allowed to make trips to China with special travel 
permits.  These individuals are different from other defectors that they are not leaving 
home permanently and have the intention of returning when their needs are fulfilled.  
C. Routes 
a. South 
 There are two  ways to escape the North.  The first method is taking the 
southbound route.  This approach is, however, extremely difficult and has taken away 
numerous lives.  In fact, only 1 out of 40 successfully makes it this way.
103
  The ROK-
DPRK border, which runs 155 miles from the West Sea to the East Sea, is known to be a 
heavily armed demilitarized zone.
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  Anyone who attempts to cross the border is 
challenged with military patrol guards, land mines, and electric wires.  Unless the 
defector has military background and is physically well trained, this path would not be 
preferred.  This is, however, the shortest route to reach the most desired destination - 
South Korea.  Some defectors therefore are willing to take a higher risk to acquire a 
greater result. 
b. North 
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 The other way is through the China-DPRK border.  North Korea shares most of 
its northern inland border with China, about 90 percent.
105
  The Tumen River is a famous 
cross place for the defectors since there are some spots where the depth of the river is 
shallow so that people can cross more easily, especially in winter when the water is 
frozen.  But, this northern route also presents many difficulties.  It takes several days to 
reach the borderline to begin with.  Security points are located every 50 meters, watching 
defectors fleeing to China and foreign spies attempting to enter the nation illegally.  
North Korean defectors who get caught by patrol guards can run away, fight, or bribe 
them.  Due to the recent economic downturn in the North, the bribery option works best 
against the border guards.  The country is where “nothing can be done without money 
and anything can be done with money.”
106
  The middle and upper class defectors often 
utilize brokers who arrange the entire trip from the DPRK to the final destination.  The 





 China may be the easiest nation in which to flee, but the defectors face countless 
tests upon arrival.  Since they are not familiar with anybody and have no place to go, they 
seek help from the Korean-Chinese and local Korean churches.  There are currently 2 
million Korean-Chinese residing in the cities near the China-DPRK border.  These local 
Koreans often offer assistance to the defectors although it is against Chinese law to help 
illegal immigrants.  It becomes harder, however, if the size of the defector group is too 
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large.  Those that bring their entire family must split up and execute separate settlement 
plans. 
 Most defectors immediately look for employment in China.  Due to their illegal 
status, they have to choose low income jobs that normally require hard labor. Most of 
them end up working in farms since agriculture is still the dominant profession in China, 
especially in the suburban areas.  Many of the female defectors are, in fact, very popular 
among Chinese farmers and are being “sold” to them as bribes since there is a gender 
imbalance in the rural areas of China.  The current trend for young Chinese women is to 
move to large cities for better employment opportunities.  Even when North Korean 
women are married to Chinese men, Chinese law specifies that they are not eligible for 
Chinese citizenship.  This law even applies to the children who are born from these 
marriages.  The children do not enjoy the chance to apply for neither legal residency nor 
citizenship. 
 Other women are extremely vulnerable to trafficking.  As they are scared of being 
forcibly repatriated, they have no option other than working for the traffickers.  Some of 
them are used as hostesses in bars or as prostitutes.   Many female defectors also end up 
being exploited.  They work for long hours with very little payment or sometimes no 
payment at all.  They know too well that their employers can report to the local 
government about their illegal immigration status.  It takes several months to relocate 
themselves to other countries.  So, the defectors have to learn to survive and make a 
living in these difficult conditions during this time period.   
China has been very unclear and ambiguous with the North Korean defector issue.  
It has never publicly declared official policy guidelines on the subject matter.  It has been 
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very reluctant to grant the status of refugees to the defectors as the nation does not see 
them as political refugees but rather economic floaters who are not qualified for legal 
protection.  One reason China is taking this position is largely due to a request by the 
DPRK.  The North frequently demands China to return the defectors.  The two nations 
also signed An Agreement on Repatriation of Border Crossers in 1987.  Sometimes China 
intensifies arrests of defectors whenever high ranking North Korean leaders visit the 
nation and hand over the defectors to the leaders upon their departure.  Still today, China 
requests Korean Chinese and Korean religious and civic organizations not to offer 
assistance to defectors and report them to the local agencies.  The fine for breaking this 
regulation is over $3,000 (USD).
108
 
b. Other Nations 
 The neighboring states in Asia and other developed countries tend to offer 
generous resettlement packages to North Korean defectors.  The popular final destination 
is the ROK for obvious reasons.  They try to find overseas South Korean embassies and 
general consulates (ROK government offices in China cannot support defectors due to the 
domestic law) or take the boats used for smuggling.  There are numerous vessels on the 
Yellow Sea that transport goods and workers between China and the South.  These ships 
also make earnings by smuggling illegal products and immigrants.  On average, it takes 
approximately a year to successfully enter the ROK.  The reward of this long journey is 
worthwhile as South Korea is known for offering adequate financial aid and appropriate 
refugee programs.  North Korean defectors have less difficulties living in the South than 
any other states. 
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 Sweden, Switzerland, and other Western European nations are also very popular 
locations for the defectors.  The countries have very strong government structure and 
have high respect for human rights.  England, in particular, pays a monthly allowance of 
$660 (USD) to the defectors once they are given asylum in the United Kingdom.
109
  The 
US has accepted a number of North Korean defectors in recent years.  It fully understands 
the current political and economic situations in the DPRK and generally grants asylum 
and assistance to North Korean immigrants.  
E. Human Rights Violations 
a. International Standards and Norms 
 Listed below are the current international human rights laws.  The DPRK 
presently shows no intention to respect the regulations, and China is also severely 
violating the laws.  It is although crucial to point out that no international law approves 
“right to enter” an adjacent state as nations have the full authority to control their 
immigration status. 
Anyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country. 
Article 13.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
Article 12.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights.” 
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Article 3, Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (ratified by China 4 October 1988) 
 
[T]he term “refugee” shall apply to any person who:…owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
Article 1, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
 
… A person who was not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee 
at a later date, is called a refugee “sur place.” 
… A person may become a refugee “sur place” as a result of his own actions, such as 
….expressing his political views in his country of residence. Whether such actions are 
sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be determined by a careful 
examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such 
actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin 
and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities. 
 
Paragraphs 94 and 96 of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook: 
Procedures and Standards for Registration, 2003 
 
No contracting state shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontier of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
 
Article 33, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
 
b. Gross Violations  
 The DPRK prohibits its citizens from leaving the nation.  This is a direct violation 
of Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12.2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Both legal regulations indicate that 
everybody has the right to leave any country, including their own.   According to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, North Korean defectors fleeing to China are identified as 
“refugees” and “asylum seekers.”  They have fear of being persecuted if they remain in 
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the North and are unwilling to return to the nation.  Paragraphs 94 and 96 of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handout mentions that the definition of 
“refugees sur place” or “refugees in place” applies to persons who may not have fled a 
nation for fear of persecution, but who will face persecution when returned to the 
country.
110
  Most North Korean defectors in China are in this situation because of the fact 
that they are categorized as traitors for leaving the nation without the permission from 
their government.  Furthermore, the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against 
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prevent states from 
expelling or returning defectors who face danger upon return to their home country.  
China is violating these terms.  Especially since it ratified the Convention against Torture 
in October 1988 and is still sending back the North Korean defectors.   
F. Recommendations 
a. China 
 China must discontinue returning North Korean defectors who are likely to suffer 
persecution upon their return to the nation.  It should permit the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees to enter China and carefully evaluate the situation of the North Korean 
defectors.  It should also comply with the Refugee Convention which it signed and 
ratified back in 1988.   
China must obey the guidelines of the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.  It has 
to investigate the condition of female North Korean defectors in China and make certain 
that they do not become victims of trafficking and marriage enslavement due to their 
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illegal immigration status.  It has to avoid returning children to the DPRK if there is 
reasonable ground to believe that they face imminent danger from their government.  
China should also allow North Korean women who have married Chinese men to apply 
for citizenship of China and their children to have access to school and health care. 
b. UN Member States 
 Europe, the US, the Northeast Asian nations, and the rest of the UN member 
states will continue to offer asylum, residence and citizenship to North Korean defectors.  
They will also present the defectors with refugee and resettlement programs and financial 
aid to help them adjust to a new lifestyle.   But, more importantly, the countries have to 
remind China that it is violating international human rights standards and norms.  They 
must keep pressuring the nation to analyze the issue with a different viewpoint and 
immediately implement proper amendments.  Since China has gained undeniable power 
over the last few decades, such a task will be hard to accomplish.  This is especially true 
since the North Korean defector matter is yet to become one of the most debated topics 
within the global community. More states are, however, acknowledging the problem 
recently as the number of defectors has grown over the past decade and the issue has 
started to cause direct impact to the countries.  It is also always ideal to manage trouble 
before it gets too problematic. 
 The number of the DPRK defectors will thus continue to increase.  More and 
more North Koreans are discovering the outside world through modern technologies, and 
they are building stronger desires to one day live in a developed society.  Unless the 
nation decides to strengthen the border security, a greater number of people will try to 
cross a frozen Tumen River and move into China.   
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Human rights workers should not concentrate on fixing the primary cause of the 
problem – poor economic and political conditions in the North.  Rather they should focus 
on the troubles the DPRK defectors face once they leave the country.  In other words, 
they should attempt to change China and its policy towards North Korean defectors.  In 
some cases, where the media was closely following the Chinese government, the nation 
sent the defectors to third countries and their desired destinations.  It can be therefore 
concluded that the pressure from the international community matters to China and can 
alter its perspective on the North. 
This is where the problem lies.  It is not about the DPRK’s struggling economy.  
It is not about its government structure.  It is rather about China’s foreign relations with 
North Korea.  If nation states, international institutions, and human rights organizations 
manage this area of problem, it will have a huge influence on the issue and help create a 












Chapter V: Arab Spring & North Korea 
1. Arab Spring - Most Impacted Nations 
A. Background 
 Similar to the term the Autumn of Nations, which describes the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the other democracy movements around the globe in 1989, the Arab Spring (or 
sometimes called the Arab Awakening) is a term that illustrates a series of riots and 
protests that occurred in the Arab world since December 2010.  The primary cause for the 
Arab Spring was dissatisfaction with government.  The citizens of the Arab states were 
displeased with dictatorship, monarchy, corruption, a weak economy, unemployment, and 
human rights violations.  People were also largely concerned about inflation and food 
security, which were a result of the 2007-2008 global famine and food price crisis.  They 
were attempting to accomplish regime change, democracy and free elections.  They 
planned to achieve these goals by revolutions, uprisings, civil wars, and demonstrations.  
The youth population played a great role in the Arab Spring.   They were literate, 
educated and Internet savvy.  In fact, they communicated, raised awareness, and 
organized the insurgencies mostly through the Internet and some of the more popular 
social media websites.  The younger generation was inspired by the lifestyle in the 
modernized, liberalized, and developed nations and desired to form a higher standard of 
living and more promising future for their own countries. 
B. Tunisia 
 The series of revolts generally took place in the Middle East and North Africa.  
The most affected nations were Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain.  It 
would not be an overstatement if one argues that the Arab Spring was initiated by a 
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Tunisian named Mohamed Bouazizi.  He was unemployed and made a living by selling 
fruits as a street vendor.  On December 17, 2010, municipal officers harassed and 
humiliated Bouazizi in public and confiscated his wares.  While street vending was legal 
in Tunisia, bribery was a normal activity and Bouazizi did not bribe the officials.  An 
hour after the incident, he expressed his anger and frustration by covering himself with 
gasoline and setting himself on fire.  His self-immolation brought together diverse groups 
dissatisfied with government to begin the Tunisian revolution.  There had been numerous 
rebellions throughout Tunisian history, but none of them were quite serious.  Following 
Bouazizi's death there were many violent riots, which resulted in a number of deaths and 
serious injuries.  Despite strong resistance from police and security forces, the 
demonstrators successfully overthrew the government, as well as the long-time Tunisian 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.  He occupied the presidency for 23 years and 
managed to flee to Saudi Arabia and avoid execution by his citizens.  New political and 
legal systems were implemented soon after Ben Ali's departure and the effect spread out 
to the neighboring Arab states and other African countries. 
C. Egypt 
 Protests started in Egypt on January 25, 2011.  At first, its government was able to 
eliminate the nation's Internet access as the rebels were organizing their rallies through 
social network services.  But, it lost control as the President Hosni Mubarak and his 
cabinet were replaced by new political members.  His successor, Mohammed Morsi, was 
the first democratically elected president in Egypt and sworn in before the supreme court 
justices.  President Mubarak was later sentenced to life in prison for failing to limit 
casualties during the earlier period of the revolution.  There were a large number of 
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deaths during the Egyptian revolution as the Armed Forces of Egypt were largely 
involved.  The military, however, also worked together with the rebels to change the 
then-current government. 
D. Libya 
 Libya can be considered a special case as the UN, the US, and many other nations 
were engaged in the situation.  Additionally, the long-time dictator, Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, was captured and killed by rebels.  Anti-government riots began in Libya in 
February 2011.  The government soon dispatched elite troops and militia to oppose the 
activities.  But, as the death toll continued to rise, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1973 and authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and all necessary measures to 
protect civilians.  Soon after the US, France, England, and other European countries 
through NATO began using force by air in Libya to bomb Gaddafi forces.  No NATO 
troops were deployed on the ground.  The confrontations in Libya were viewed as a civil 
war instead of protests in a sense that the scale was much greater and the government 
refused to back down or compromise, as they had in Tunisia and Egypt. 
E. Yemen 
 The Yemeni revolution erupted to press the resignation of President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh.  A series of protest marches were carried out in major cities, and the demonstrators 
and frequent military encounters turned into urban warfare.  President Saleh was given an 
opportunity to agree to the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, which requested his 
resignation in exchange for immunity.  As he was hesitant to sign the agreement, a 
number of assassination attempts were conducted including a bomb blast in the 
presidential compound.  President Saleh and much of the government staff suffered 
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physically injuries from the attack.  A few months later, he decided to step down and 
transfer the authority to the Vice President Abd al-Rah Mansur al-Hadi, who later was 
voted to take over the presidency. 
F. Syria 
 Syria also experienced a civil war and the uprising began in a manner similar to 
the one in Tunisia.  A police officer assaulted a man in public in old Damascus.   Plus, the 
security forces arrested 15 children in a southern Syria city, Daraa, for writing slogans 
against the government.  Soon after, protestors gathered together in a large group to call 
for the release of the children and initiated riots against the Baathist regime, which had 
been ruling Syria since 1963.  They formed the Free Syrian Army to fight against the 
Syrian military.  The Syrian forces, however, were too strong for the rebels and were not 
hesitant to hurt civilians and often committed massacres, killing thousands of innocent 
people.  At this date, the conflict is still on-going in Syria and over 100,000 people have 
died with over six million individuals forced to leave their homes. 
G. Bahrain 
 The demonstrations in Bahrain began in a more peaceful way.  The initial aim 
was to obtain greater political freedom and respect for human rights.  They were not 
intending to overthrow the monarchy.  The protests, however, became more violent as 
police and army forces tried to resist the rallies and in the process harmed a number of 
individuals.  After the killings, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa ordered his troops to 
withdraw.  But, as the marches became more intense, he had to declare a state of 
emergency and send back the forces.  There were reports that the police committed 
torture and other human rights violations such as denial of medical care to prisoners who 
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were captured during the parades.  The Bahrain government does not strictly deny these 
facts, but has refused entry to international human rights groups, UN inspectors, and 
news organizations. 
H. The Rest 
 The Arab Spring has affected not only the surrounding areas but also the rest of 
the globe.  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania, Croatia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, 
Nigeria, and even an Asian nation, the Maldives, were all influenced by the events.  
Protest movements in the Maldives led to the resignation of its President.  While the 
international community has been supporting the uprisings, some critics have accused the 
US and other developed countries for not getting involved.  Other than the Libyan case, 
they have not been engaged and have decided to observe the happenings without taking 
sides, except for humanitarian aid to rebels in Syria.  As stated above, the youth and their 
Internet and digital technology usage have been a crucial part of the Arab Spring.  In fact, 
the number of social media network users doubled during the protests.  The younger 
generation has created a new concept of a 'digital democracy' and proven how shared 
ideas and dynamics of the crowd in a participatory system have an enormous power to 
form collective action. 
2. Synthesis & Analysis - North Korea 
A. Effect on the DPRK 
 The Arab Spring had a limited effect in the DPRK.  There were several other 
factors that could explain why similar riots did not occur in North Korea.  First, unlike 
the Arab states, there had been very little economic development in the North.  People 
who visited Pyongyang would recognize some changes, but there has hardly been any 
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modernizing effort and the overall economic growth has continued to be very low.  The 
per capita gross national income in 2009, $960, was lower compared to 1990, at 
$1,146.
111
  The life expectancy rate was also down from 70.2 to 67.4.
112
  About one-third 
of the population live in extreme poverty.  The key element of the Arab Spring, rising 
expectations and hope for a better lifestyle, was absent from the society.  Its citizens were 
too concerned with daily survival and the next meal. 
 North Korea has a relatively young and literate population.  The median age is 
32.9 years.
113
  Literacy rate is 100 percent.
114
  This population is, however, different from 
the Arab states and is unlikely to fight against the government.  In a communist country, 
there are no unemployed personnel as everyone labors for the state.  These people could 
be paid a very small salary, but were not dissatisfied with their employment status as the 
young individuals in the Middle East.  Moreover, North Korean young males spend up to 
12 years in the military.
115
  This is perhaps the longest service terms in the entire globe.  
And the purpose is to maintain a strong force and keep young men out of trouble.  There 
is also no leisure time available for the youth to gather and share ideas.  The government 
always forces them to participate in extra activities and ideological indoctrination. 
 The contagion effect did not work well in the North either.  As soon as the 
revolutions began to intensify in the Middle East, the DPRK prohibited its citizens from 
using the Internet, watching television, using radio, and visiting foreign countries, which 
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included restricted travelling of its diplomats.
116
  It did not want its people to witness the 
Arab Spring and formulate similar actions against the government.  Some non-
governmental organizations sent leaflets and newspaper reports into North Korea 
describing the rebellions in the Arab states.  They utilized various methods to do this, but 
these attempts affected only a very small percentage of the whole population.  The 
literacy rate was sufficiently high, but Internet access and a free press were not available 
in the North for people to be influenced by the Arab Awakening. 
 Cellular phone usage was also a comparable element.  The cellular phone was 
first introduced in the DPRK in 2002.  At first, only the elites in Pyongyang were 
permitted to use the phones.  But, in 2004, the government banned the usage of mobile 
phones as it discovered that an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il was made, utilizing a 
cell phone-detonated bomb.  More recently, in 2008, an Egyptian corporation, Orascom, 
acquired the sole contract to sell mobile phones in North Korea.  A year later, the 
company sold 70,000 units.  At the time of the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 and 2012, 
the number rose to 500,000.  This increase, however, only represented approximately 1.8 
percent of the population.   
 Another piece that was present in the Arab Spring but missing in the North was 
the exiled elites.  This group embodied individuals who left their county to gain 
education and employment and return to their homeland with plans and a desire to rebuild 
and reform the nation.  An Egyptian, Mohamed ElBaradei, is a perfect example of this 
case.  ElBaradei was educated and worked in Western countries, including his tenure as 
the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  He later returned to 
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Egypt and was a symbol of reform for the rebel groups during the revolutionary 
movements.  He was fully involved in politics and later became the Egyptian vice 
president.  The DPRK, however, lacks this kind of leader figure.  Most of the defectors 
fleeing North Korea blamed the economic situation, and quite surprisingly not the dear 
leaders or overall political situation.  As was seen during the Arab Spring, leaders or self-
immolation sparked the revolutions.  But, these factors were nonexistent in North Korea.  
B. The Korean Spring 
 The Korean Spring, however, is still a possibility.  It is not just because the DPRK 
government could not completely stop the stories from spreading mostly in a large city 
like Pyongyang.  The elites and university students had access to the Internet and the 
news on the Arab Spring could be told to one another through word-of-mouth.  There is 
also a series of events that occurred in North Korea in recent years.  
 In 2002, after North Korea survived a severe famine, it went through a brief 
economic reform.  The public distribution system had failed and the government had no 
choice but to lift price controls and introduce market mechanisms.  The regime simply 
did not have any food to give out and told its people to fend for themselves.  It received 
foreign aid and loans and the economy was able to recover after a while.  It resumed the 
ration system, but was incapable of completely ending market activity.  Today, the 
citizens of the North rely heavily on markets.  The farmers, factory workers, and urban 
residents all do business on the black market and collect substantial profit.  During 
interviews, the DPRK defectors admitted that more than half of their income was 
generated from private practices.  The individuals residing in Pyongyang purchase their 
food from the market.  Experts predict that it is almost impossible to make this activity 
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disappear in North Korea.
117
  Even if it has already been 12 years since the country tried 
to modify its economic structure, people cannot forget what they saw and experienced.  
Additionally, the market system allows individuals to start their own businesses and this 
entrepreneurship creates independence from the government.  The currency 
redenomination in 2009 is also a memorable occasion for its citizens.  To uproot 
marketization, the government implemented the new denomination and people could only 
exchange a portion of their savings for the new currency.  The citizens reacted to the 
situation with anger and despair.  Some of them committed suicide, fought with police, 
and defiantly protested in the public square.  This behavior showed that a portion of the 
population no longer fear the regime.
118
  Through these two incidents, Kim Jong Il left a 
mark on society in North Korea that is irreversible and can damage the regime later on. 
 Until recently, the North had only one Facebook and Twitter account that was set 
up by the government.  This is, however, changing very rapidly.  The Pyongyang 
University of Science and Technology (PUST) was opened in 2010.  The nation needs 
the Internet to obtain information without sending its personnel to foreign countries.  The 
Internet saves them money and limits interaction with foreigners.  The Internet also helps 
the regime to mobilize foreign direct investment.  The government staff therefore can use 
the Internet for intelligence purposes and the university students for educational ones.  
This is, however, a very risky project for the regime.  It is allowing the best and smartest 
groups to gain access to the Internet and surf the web.  Someone who has negative views 
towards the government can spread news about the Arab Spring and the truth about the 
outside world and that there are better societies and they too can make changes to live 
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quality lives.  The Internet is very much like the market system.  Once people know there 
are tools available that provide them convenience and efficiency, it is extremely hard to 
take that away from them.   
 Cellular phones apply a similar formula.  Phones enable better communication 
and are necessary devices for the elites in the DPRK.  Even though the regime limits cell 
phone usage to select people, some people buy phones smuggled in from China on 
prepaid SIM cards.  These individuals not only communicate with each other via mobile 
devices but also have web access.  This is something the government cannot control 
unless it shuts down its entire wireless infrastructure, which the elites would not agree to 
do because of the inconvenience it may bring upon their daily lives.  The total number of 
mobile phone users has now passed 2 million.
119
  It took three years to reach 1 million 
users, but only one year to double that number.  The number is continuing to grow and is 
spreading like wild-fire.  
 The regime witnessed the Arab Spring and is apparently affected by what 
happened on the other side of the globe.  Its reactions to the events reflected a sense of 
vulnerability.
120
  The revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa proved to them that 
authoritarian regimes were inherently unstable.  The government relies heavily on its 
military.  There have been a number of reported domestic disturbances.  The military, 
however, has always been there to prevent the actions from widening.  Although, if the 
youth in the military should decide to disobey Kim Jong Un, it would be a totally 
different scenario.  Its forces would be fighting against each other.  Prior to the Arab 
Spring, most persons believed that things would not change in the region.  But the Arab 
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governments collapsed all of a sudden and in a reasonably short period of time.  All four 
dictators - Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar 
Qaddafi of Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh - had each been ruling their regimes longer 
than Kim Jong Il and definitely Kim Jong Un.  The new young leader and his cabinet 




Chapter VI: Kaesong Industrial Zone 
1. Background 
 The Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) is in the city of Kaesong, the DPRK.  The 
KIZ is located 43 miles north of the capital of the ROK, Seoul, and 106 miles southeast 
of the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang.  It is also only 3 miles away from the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ).  The KIZ is a unique place in a sense that it is one location 
where people from the South and the North are allowed to interact on a daily basis.  To 
be more specific, it is an industrial complex where the two Koreas agreed to build a joint 
economic territory with a combination of North's human labor and South's capital 
investment and business knowhow.  As indicated in Table 2 below, the KIZ is growing 
quickly since its opening in 2004.  The two nations also plan to make a significant 
expansion within a few years.  This thesis finds that the KIZ serves as a unique element 
that can affect the DPRK reform. 
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40,874 69,999 100,092 152,637 111,830 122,997 114,435 120,119 
 
2. Sunshine Policy 
 The KIZ project was initiated when the ROK President, Kim Dae Jung, visited the 
DRPK in 2000.  The President and the leader of the North, Kim Jong Il, agreed to form 
an economic relationship.  North Korea went through a devastating famine in the late 
1990s and needed to desperately improve its economic situation.  Kim Jong Il came up 
with various ways to restore the economy including boosting foreign investment, trade 
and aid from the neighboring states such as Japan, China, and Russia.  The KIZ was also 
another ideal approach, and this was true for a number of reasons.   
 The ROK agreed to take the entire financial burden and develop the complex 
from scratch.  Two large South Korean firms, Hyundai Asan and the Korea Land 
Corporation, mostly managed the 800 acres development process.  The KIZ contains not 
only state-of-the-art manufacturing factories but also all other necessary supporting 
facilities including a post office, police and fire stations, a library, a hospital, an 
exhibition center, a bank, and lodging.  It also has an extensive infrastructure system, 
which includes road, railroad, telecommunication, electricity, water supply (purification 
and drainage plant), and waste plant.  Additionally, the DPRK enjoys the opportunity to 
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train its workers and help them obtain diverse business and management skills.  Most 
ROK companies operating in the KIZ serve in different industries, which allows the 
North Korean laborers to attain diverse experiences and knowledge.  Lastly, the nation 
collects constant income from the salary paid by the South Korean companies to its 
citizens working in the KIZ which totals approximately $30 million per year.
121
  There 
are also other business fees.  Hyundai Asan, for instance, paid $450 million in 2000 to 
purchase a business license.
122
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 The ROK companies are attracted to the KIZ despite the risk that is involved in 
doing business in a communist country.  First, the minimum wage rate is lower than 
China and Vietnam.  There is a low employee turnover rate and no possibility of labor 
dispute.  Second, the rent price for land is US$41 per square meter, which is five times 
less than other industrial parks.  Third, the corporate income tax rate is only 14% of the 
net profit.
123
  The firms get a tax exemption for five years from the first profit-generating 
year and the tax rate is cut by 50% for the following three years.
124
  Fourth, the South 
offers loans with low interest rates and political risk insurance that will reimburse up to 
90% of a company's investment in the KIZ.  Fifth, the KIZ is close to the ROK's Incheon 
International Airport and there are no applied tariffs.  Sixth, the KIZ is a duty-free area.  
Anyone can use foreign currency and credit cards and there is no visa required for entry 
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or exit.  Lastly, the complex has its own law and South Koreans faced with legal issues 
are not to go on trial in the DPRK.  The South Korean government expects the number of 
firms moving into the KIZ will rise as the complex will expand to 6,000 acres with 
shopping districts, residential areas, and tourist and recreation facilities.   
3. Issues 
A. Labor  
 It is often claimed that the KIZ workers are being exploited and the DPRK is 
violating the international human rights and labor law.  This is because it is unclear what 
portion of the wages they acquire from the ROK companies for their labor is kept for 
themselves and how much is being given to their government.  It is estimated that the 
North Korean authorities take as much as 45%.
125
  Experts, however, assert that the KIZ 
average wages and working conditions are much better compared to other individuals in 
the North.  The monthly minimum wage is $60.78.
126
  The employees receive a 15% 
social insurance fee provided for unemployment and occupational hazards.
127
  They get 
overtime pay for extended working hours.  They receive 14 days per year vacation time 
and female staff members are given 60 days paid maternity leave.  The workers are 
offered with free commute to the KIZ.  Their health conditions have enhanced as they 
have had access to better nutrition.  Employers are prohibited from freely punishing 
employees and firing incompetent staff.  The workers, however, do not enjoy the right to 
change employers.  The idea is to prevent labor costs from escalating and to let firms 
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maintain a stable workforce.  This practice, however, goes against the global workers' 
rights. 
B. Financial Benefits for the Regime 
 It is important to identify how much the DPRK, a state that has been creating 
problems for international security, is taking advantage of the money produced from the 
KIZ project.  The employee salaries are first delivered in hard currency (dollars) to the 
North Korean government, and it deducts some portion (social insurance taxes and a 
socio-cultural policy fee) before distributing to the workers.  Article 234 of the Labor 
Law of the KIZ, however, states that wages must be paid directly to employees in cash.  
It is assumed that the government collects approximately $2 million per month from the 
staff salaries.
128
  The other payments also include land lease fees, corporate income tax, 
sales of raw materials and other industrial products, and employee recruiting services.  
C. Import from and Export to the KIZ 
 Another critical issue is whether the US and other nations should ban products 
that are made in the KIZ.  Currently, the US is imposing a sanction on the DPRK due to 
its development program of nuclear warhead and weapons of mass destruction.  It forbids 
the North Korean made goods, services and technology to enter the American border 
without approval of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 
Treasury.  It also disallows merchandise made from a third country that utilized North 
Korean products and technology to be brought into the US.  The sanction has affected the 
recently signed Korea-US Free Trade Agreement and America decided not to recognize 
goods made in the KIZ as made in the ROK and therefore the merchandise are not subject 
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to the benefits of reduced tariffs.  Although, the European Union classifies the situation 
as a special case of products refined outside the South Korean region and does not 
impose tariffs.  
 In terms of the US exports to the KIZ, the Department of Commerce reviews and 
licenses all American exports to the DPRK and the Department of Treasury grants 
licenses for certain financial transactions.  In 2006, for example, the US Bureau of 
Industry and Security approved glass fiber optic transmission items and software to be 
shipped to the KIZ and the shipments were used for telecommunication equipment in 
setting up the communication lines into the KIZ.
129
    
4. Stakes and Interests 
 It is crucial to understand the significance of the continuing operation of the KIZ 
and the interests of the related parties.  First, the ROK believes that the KIZ is a gateway 
to the DPRK's reform.  More than 50,000 North Koreans come to the KIZ every day and 
meet South Koreans.  They hear and witness through tools like the Internet that there is a 
better world outside.  These experiences strengthen their desire for betterment and a 
higher life standard.  China and the Arab states have changed for this reason and settled 
to adopt the new global modernizing system.  The South firmly relies on this theory and 
that its economic engagement with the North will lead to increased peace and political 
cooperation.  This was proven true when the ROK government chose not to close down 
the KIZ even after the DPRK destroyed a South Korean naval vessel with a torpedo 
missile and launched an artillery attack on a South Korean island in 2010.   
 Second, North Korea regards the KIZ as one of its key sources of income.  Simply 
put, the complex is a lucrative business.  According to a recent study, the DPRK has 





earned roughly over $10 billion from the KIZ productions since its opening in 2004.
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The government is aware of the fact that the complex negatively affects its citizens and 
could escalate the possibility of an uprising.  The KIZ, however, creates plenty of 
revenue for the regime and too much is at stake to discontinue this profitable venture.   
 Lastly, America and other nations' interests in the KIZ are also quite substantial.  
They are first concerned about the economic profit the KIZ produces for the DPRK 
government and the possibility that this money is directed towards funding its military 
and nuclear program.  It is, however, unsure how the income is being spent and there is 
no possible method available to discover the country's financial arrangements unless the 
government makes this information accessible, which is highly unlikely to occur at least 
within the foreseeable future.  The international community also values a market-based 
economy and representative government.  It thinks the KIZ is a great opportunity to bring 
changes in North Korea, but at the same time the complex working conditions, 
environment regulations, and other humanitarian matters should be par with the 
international norms and legal standards.  These subjects shall be addressed now and 
before the KIZ becomes a larger complex.  
5. Recommendations 
 It is recommended that global policymakers apply the following solutions to 
resolve the issues involved in the KIZ project and help expand the business. 
- Adjust free trade agreements and allow South Korean companies in the KIZ or firms in 
the South that buy the parts made in the complex to receive the benefits of the agreement 
and avoid any tariffs when exporting to America.  This would encourage more ROK 





corporations to move into the KIZ, which would intensify the chances of a North Korean 
reform.  
- For the same reason, policymakers should allow a third country to do business with the 
ROK companies operating in the KIZ. 
- While adjusting the FTA, it should be demanded that the South Korean government to 
pay more attention to labor and other conditions in the KIZ. 
- Loosen up the sanctions imposed on the DPRK and increase the amount of export from 
the KIZ into other nations and foreign export and investment in the KIZ.  Request other 
countries to do the same.  
- Take the necessary steps to resume normal trading relations status with North Korea. 
- Ask both China and Russia to set up similar industrial parks in the northern part of the 
DPRK, across from their national borders. 
- Form a committee, similar to the United Nations Panel of Experts, whose primary duty 
is to oversee KIZ issues and progress. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 After reform takes place in the DPRK, the nation will struggle to form a new 
government system.  The UN, the ROK, the US, and other nations have to help the nation 
implement the right political and legal system.  More importantly, however, North Korea 
must quickly find ways to enhance its economy and feed over 20 million people.  
Immediate reunification with South Korea and reliance on its support should not be 
considered as an option.  The South economy would suffer tremendously as it was clearly 
shown in the German reunification.  Most people in the ROK would strongly refuse this 
idea.  The World Bank (WB), rather, can offer assistance to the North and will play a 
vital role in modeling the future of the North Korean economy.  
 The WB was established at the end of World War II to rehabilitate the 
international community.  In the 1970s, its focus shifted towards solving economic 
problems of developing countries.  Today, the institution has set goals to end extreme 
poverty and boost shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% 
for every country.
131
  Through effective allocation of resources in areas such as education, 
health, public administration, infrastructure, financial sector, agriculture, environmental 
and natural resource management, the WB seeks to make economic and social progress in 
underdeveloped regions of the world.  The members of the Bank are 188 nations, 
comprised of the 187 UN member countries and Kosovo.  All member states are eligible 
to borrow grants and seek consultation from the World Bank.  Currently, the DPRK is not 
a member and the first step towards enhancing its economy is gaining the WB 
membership.  
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 The Bank operates on a project basis, and the aims of each project should align 
with the mission of the institution.  Its recent projects were conducted in the Arab Spring 
nations.  It issued Interim Strategy Note (ISN) to some of these countries such as Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Yemen.  The ISN delineated strategies for these nations to cope with post 
Arab Spring situations involving social and political unrest.  The ISN stated that the 
organization was especially focusing on (1) solidifying the new governance by increasing 
transparency and accountability, (2) building foundation for sustainable economic growth 
and jobs creation, and (3) modernizing infrastructure to benefits disadvantaged social 
groups such as women, the youth and the poor.
132
  
 In Tunisia, the WB initiated thirteen new projects and of these projects, five 
projects specifically targeted to aid the political transition.  The rest of the projects 
concentrated on environment, rural development, human development and water.  The 
biggest project, totaling in the amount of $1 billion of lending, was put in to the 
Governance and Opportunity Development Policy Lending (DPL) Program to fund the 
interim government in June 2011 and November 2012.
133
 
 In the case of Egypt, the organization has taken up nine projects since the uprising 
of total $4.6 billion.
134
  About $ 200 million was put into the Emergency Labor Intensive 
Investment Project and the Youth Employment Project to combat the high unemployment 
rate in the youth.
135
  Financing for the Micro and Small Enterprises Project distributed 
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more than 75,000 loans, creating over 100,000 jobs, especially targeting the youth group 
between the ages of 21 to 25.
136
  The Bank also carried out projects aiming at the low 
income households.  The Natural Gas Connections Project yielded a gas distribution 
network to 90,000 low income households, while creating 3,000 jobs in Cairo and Giza.  
The expansion of the housing market was realized through creating both supply and 
demand.  In June 2013, the government built 75,000 new units of housing offered at a 
special rate.  At the same time, the Mortgage Finance subsidies Program provided 8,400 
subsidies to households, which aimed to stimulate the housing market and establish 
transparent mortgage programs.   
 Yemen has one the lowest GDP among the Arabic nations.  Yemen also has one 
of the highest population growth rates in the world and 45% of the population lives with 
food insecurity.
137
  The poverty rate, which marked 42% in 2009, has risen to 54.5% in 
2012 due to the recent political crisis, a part of the Arab Spring movement.
138
  The WB 
has generated twenty new projects since the civilian uprising in 2011 and a total of $317 
million has been distributed, following the agreement made at the Yemen Donors 
Conference in September 2012.
139
  Among these, some projects were implemented to 
provide direct relief.  The Emergency Crisis Recovery Project received the largest 
amount of loan, a total of $100 million, in which cash benefits were offered to eligible 
poor households through Social Welfare Fund program.
140
  Human development is not an 
exception in the Bank’s commitment in Yemen.  A total of $66 million was approved for 
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the Second Basic Education Development Project, which ensured basic education 
through building schools and training teachers to promote equal access to quality 
educations.  Other ongoing projects, such as Modernization of the Central Bank of 
Yemen, aim to rebuild the infrastructure system which is crucial for Yemen to become a 
viable economy.  
 As shown in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, the WB has resources and 
expertise to help a country cope with political and social unrest.  The purpose of the Bank 
in North Korea should be advancing the living standard of the citizens and to help build a 
sustainable economy.  In particular, it should concentrate on the following sectors; 
infrastructure, improving healthcare, education, and food security. 
 With its capital Pyongyang being the only major city in the DPRK, the general 
population lives in rural areas with little or no infrastructure.  Throughout the nation, the 
WB should launch infrastructure building projects that are necessary to live a modern life 
such as gas, electricity and waste water system.  These projects will be labor intensive 
public works that create jobs and provide ground work for a competitive market economy.   
 At the early stage, the WB should commit to the development of information and 
communication infrastructure since the citizens in North Korea have a limited channel of 
information to the outside world.  The North will have geographical advantages, 
bordering China and Russia towards the North and proximity to South Korea and Japan.  
The upgrade and development of transportation systems, such as roads and railways, is 
therefore crucial and will not only induce internal growth, but also place North Korea in 
an important portal of exchange in northeast Asia.    
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 For building sustainable communities, the Bank should seek targeted regional 
growth.  Identification of the unique characteristics and economic resources at a local 
level should be conducted as well as implementation that will bring out the maximum 
potential of the targeted region.  For example, a village built around a mining ore will 
need certain types of infrastructure such as a road system to effectively transport the 
production.  A port city will appreciate expansion and modernization of the port logistics 
system to increase traffic capacity.  In major farmlands, irrigation system development 
and construction of renewable energy sources will ensure increased production and long 
term environmental benefits.      
 Like most underdeveloped countries, a significant ratio of the population suffers 
from malnutrition and lack of medical care.  Modernization of infrastructure such as 
clean water supply and waste system will certainly reduce the future risks.  The DPRK 
will benefit from interventions and targeted aid programs that will bring the improvement 
on the population’s existing state of health.  For instance, the critical indicators of health, 
maternal and infant mortality rates are especially high in rural areas.  As an immediate 
relief, the WB can offer various types of assistance such as social welfare program, health 
service packages for pregnant women and children and incentives for healthcare 
providers, and distribution of vaccines and medical service.  As a preventive measure to 
health problems and ensure that improvements on the healthcare sector are sustainable, 
the institution should take upon projects providing education on basic nutrition, hygiene, 
and signs of common illness such as water borne diseases.  Programs for training medical 
staff, nurses, and midwifery along with strengthening of public healthcare system will 
help North Korea in building a reliable and accessible healthcare system.  Successful 
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delivery of these projects will not only improve the general welfare of the population, but 
also strengthen the existing and future labor force. 
 In the North, educational opportunity is limited to those who are privileged.  The 
citizens receive basic education, which is concentrated on fostering the political agenda.  
Major reform in the primary educational system will be inevitable in the nation, 
especially in the time of political transition.  The goal of potential projects should be 
setting a standard for basic education and ensuring all citizens access for a certain level of 
learning experiences.  Through projects such as defining school districts, delivery of 
educational materials and supplies, training programs for teachers, and creating 
incentives for low income parents to send their children to school can be potential 
projects supported by the Bank.  The community involvement in construction of schools 
will also generate jobs.  For secondary education, the organization should focus on 
preparing the younger generation through offering a system where they can get technical 
and vocational training.  They will compose a quality labor force that will drive economic 
growth.   
 In 2002, the North Korean government allowed private farmer’s market on an 
experimental level to increase agricultural output; however the general population deals 
with food insecurity on a daily basis.  The WB has several case studies on resolving the 
issue and the food security project in the DPRK should aim to achieve modernization of 
agricultural industry and reaching out to the most disadvantaged groups.   Subsidies on 
fertilizers and seeds will create a short term production boost in supply, while vouchers 
and food stamps can be distributed among low income households to create a consumer 
base.  Projects on the assessment of soil quality, equipment, resources operation and 
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management should be conducted.  Then, the farmers should receive education and 
training for estimating crop yields and preparing for natural disasters.  The modernization 
of the irrigation system will be also crucial as rural farmlands are especially prone to 
drought, which can lead to a famine. 
 A developed and modernized DPRK brings numerous benefits to the global 
community.  The world becomes a safer place without North Korean nuclear weapons 
and WMDs.  Both South and North Korea can reduce military spending and concentrate 
on other national agendas.  The US and other UN members will be able to withdraw their 
troops located in the area.  Nations will have another trading partner, and worldwide 
corporations will have another market to enter and over 20 million potential customers to 
sell their products and services.  There will no longer be human rights violations in the 
North, and its people and children would be able to have access to food and medical care. 
Most significantly, however, a reformed DPRK increases the possibility of reunification.  
Many of the movies and television shows in the ROK carry stories of North Korea.  This 
proves that South Koreans have a great interest in the issue and always think about the 
matter in the back of their minds.  They feel a great sorrow for not being able to visit their 
hometowns and see their family members.  It should be extremely difficult to be 
separated with its own people for over sixty years and identify them as an enemy.  The 
two countries share the same history, ancestors, culture, food, customs, and language.  
Since their division in 1948, there have not been too many changes in terms of their 
nationality features.  They sincerely want this problem to be resolved during their lifetime.  
As this thesis finds, the day will come soon.  Modern activities will eventually force 
North Korean reform.  Whether it is initiated by a street vendor, students, social groups, 
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or a courageous political leader, this thesis predicts that there will soon be revolutionary 
movements in the North.  The people may have to make sacrifices, but it is imperative for 
the welfare of those living under these repressive conditions and for a united Korea that 






Ahn, Myung Chul. Total Restricted Area: Testimonies of Former North Korean Prison  
Camp  Guard. Seoul, Korea: Si Dae Jung Shin, 2007. 
 
Alamgit, Jalal. "Myanmar's Foreign Trade and Its Political Consequences."  
Asian Survey 48, no.6 (November/December 2008): 977-996. 
Aronson, Geoffrey. “How the Arab Spring Presages a Shifting World Order,” Foreign  
Policy, May 17, 2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/17/ 
how_the_arab_spring_presages_a_shifting_world_order, accessed March 2014.   
Applebaum, Stephen. "The Boy Who Grew Up in North Korea's Labour Camp 14."  
The Guardian, September 19, 2013.  
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/sep/19/north-korea-prison-camp-14-
documentary, accessed January 2014. 
 
Asada, Masahiko. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the  
Universalization of the Additional Protocol.”Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 
2011.http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/1/3.abstract, accessed March 2014. 
 
Bajoria, Jayshree. “The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program.” Council on  
Foreign Relations, February 29, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-
talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593, accessed March 2014. 
 
Barkan, Joel D. "Regime Change in Africa." National Endowment for Democracy and the  
Journal of Democracy 10, no. 2 (April 1999): 165-170. 
  
Bassett, Richard M. and Lewis H. Carlson. And the Wind Blew Cold: The Story of an  
American Power in North Korea. Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 
2002. 
  
Batchimeg, Migeddorj. "Mongolia's DPRK Policy: Engaging North Korea." Asian Survey  
46, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 275-297. 
 
Bilby, Ethan. "EU Approves Tighter Sanctions on North Korea." Reuters, February 18,  
2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/us-korea-north-eu-
 idUSBRE91H0E120130218, accessed January 2014. 
 
Blackwell, Tom. "We Were Slave Owners': Ex-Prison Guard Taught to View North  
Korean Inmates as Sub-Human 'Enemies'.” National Post, September 27, 2013. 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/09/27/we-were-slave-owners-ex-prison-guard-
taught- to-view-north-korean-inmates-as-sub-human-enemies, accessed March 
2014. 
 
Borger, Julian. “North Korea Curbs Nuclear Programme in Return for Food Aid.” The  
 
 
Guardian, February 29, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-
global-security-blog/2012/feb/29/dprk-nuclear-deal, accessed 11/11/2012. 
 
Branigan, Tania. “North Korea: Q&A.” The Guardian, May 25, 2009.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/25/north-korea-question-and-answer, 
accessed January 2014. 
 
Casa, David. "Imposing EU Sanctions on North Korea." The Malta Independent, April  
13, 2013. http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-04 
13/opinions/imposing-eu-sanctions-on-north-korea-1380417541, accessed March 
2014. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook - Korea, South."
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html, 
 accessed March 2014.   
Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook - Korea, North."
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html, 
 accessed March 2014.   
 
Cha, Victor. Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security 
Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 
 
Cha, Victor. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005. 
 
Cha, Victor. The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. New York: 
HarperCollins, 2012. 
 
Cha, Victor D. and Nicholas D. Anderson. “A North Korean Spring?.” The Washington 
Quarterly 35, no.1 (2012): 7-24. 
 
Chaffee, Devon."North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official." 
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, April 10, 2003. 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2003/04/10_chaffee_korea-npt.htm, 
accessed March 2014. 
 
Chamberlin, Paul F. "Six-Party Talks: Time for Change." Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs (2007): 59-67. 
 
Chang, Gordon G. Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World. New York, 
Random House, 2006. 
 
Chasmar, Jessica. “Report sheds light on ‘Bright’ - North Korea’s version of Internet,”  
The Washington Times, February 3, 2014. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/3/report-sheds-light-bright-




Cho, Yun-Jo. “The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from  
Democratization Theory.” The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea. 
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5, no.1 (Winter 2005): 90-99.  
 
Choe, Sang-Hun. "North Korean Defectors Tell U.N. Panel of Prison Camps Abuses."  
The New York Times, August 20, 2013.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/world/asia/north-korean-defectors-tell-un-
panel-of-prison-camp-abuses.html?_r=0, accessed March 2014. 
 
Choi, Young-jin.“Human Right Infringement on North Korean Refugees, Migration  
Networks and Policy Implication in Asia. Korea University Peace and 
Democracy Institute (2011): 385-429. 
 
Chung, Byung-Ho. “Between Defectors and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North  
Koreas in South Korea.”University of Hawaii Korean Studies Vol. 32 (2008). 
Chung, Young Chul. "North Korean Reform and opening: Dual Strategy and Silli  
(Practical) Socialism.” Pacific Affairs 77, no.2 (Summer 2004): 283-304. 
 




Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Global health, and human  
Rights. "Human Rights in North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities." House of 
 Representatives (2012). 
Cossa, Ralph A. “The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: Is It Still Viable? Is It Enough?”  
Pacific Forum CSIS (1999). 
 
Council of Foreign Relations. “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” The CFR Website. 
http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty/p8437, accessed 
January 2014. 
Cull, Robert and Laurie Effron. “World Bank Lending and Financial Sector  
Development.” The World Bank Economic Review 22, no. 2 (2008): 315-343, via 
JSTOR, accessed April 2014.  
Dale, Christopher D. "Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002  
Economic Measures." Asian Survey 45, no.6 (November/December 2005): 823-
842. 
 
Duffy, Michael. “What Does North Korea Want?” The Time Magazine, February 13,  
2005. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1027498,00.html, 




European Union. “EU relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North  
Korea).” http://eeas.europa.eu/korea_north/index_en.htm, accessed February 
2014. 
 
Fearon, James and David Laitin, “The Two Koreas,” Stanford University Working Paper  
KoreasRN 1.5, 2006. 
 
Freedom House. “2014 Freedom in the World.” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U04S0InD_IU, 
accessed April 2014. 
 
Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and The Olive Tree. New York: Farra, Straus and  
Giroux, 1999. 
 
Friedman, Thomas L. The World Is Flat. New York: Farra, Straus and Giroux, 2005. 
Gardner, Andrew. "EU Looks to Sanctions to Force a North Korean Climbdown."  
European Voice. April 11, 2013. 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eu-looks-to-sanctions-to-force-a-
north-korean-climbdown/76920.aspx, accessed February 2014. 
 
Graham, Edward M. "The Matter of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the Korea-US  
Free Trade Agreement Negotiations." Institute for International Economics. 
Guo, Sujian and Gary A. Stradiotto. “The Nature and Direction of Economic Reform in  
North Korea.” Political Studies 55 (2007): 754-778. 
 
Harden, Brian. Escape from Camp 14: One Ma's Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea  
to Freedom in the West. New York: Penguin Books, 2013. 
 
Hale, Christopher D. “Real Reform in North Korea?.” Asian Survey 45, no.6  
(November/December 2005): 823-842. 
 
Harlan, Chico. "North Korean Prison Camp Survivors Tell U.N. Investigators of Right  
Abuses." The Washington Post, August 21, 2013. 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08- 21/world/41431716_1_political-
prison-camps-north-koreans-rights-abuses, accessed March 2014. 
 
Harrison, Selig S. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
 
Hawk, David. "North Korea's Hidden Gulag." Human Rights Watch in North Korea  
(2013). 
 
Hawk, David. “The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of Those Who are Sent to the  






Hawk, David. "The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps (Prison  
Testimonies and Satellite Photographs, US Committee for Human Rights in North  
Korea). U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (2001). 
Hawkins, Darren. "Democratization Theory and Nontrasitions: Insights from Cuba."  
Comparative Politics 33, no. 4 (July 2001): 441-461. 
 
Hayden, Jones. "EU Strengthens Sanctions Against North Korea After Nuclear Test."  
Bloomberg, February 18, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-18/eu-
strengthens-sanctions- against-north-korea-after-nuclear-test.html, accessed March 
2014. 
 
Hoare, Jim. "Ten Years On, Six-Party Talks' Role Had Shifted Permanently." Global  
Times, October 10, 2015. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/817951.html, 
accessed March 2014.   
 
Hong, Adrian. “How to Free North Koreans,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2011,  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/19/how_to_free_north_korea? 
page=0,3, accessed March 2014.   
 
Huntley, Wade L. "North Korea & the NPT." Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2, 2004.  
 http://www.fpif.org/reports/north_korea_the_npt, accessed 03/11/2013, accessed  
February 2014. 
 
Hickey, Michael. “The Korean War: An Overview.” BBC, March 21, 2011.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml,  
accessed March 2014. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “Democracy’s Third Wave - The Third Wave. Democratization in  
the late Twentieth Century.” The Review of Politics 55, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 348 - 
351.  
 
Huntley, Wade L. "North Korea & the NPT." Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2, 2004. 
 http://www.fpif.org/reports/north_korea_the_npt, accessed March 2014. 
 
Institute of North Korean Studies. “Military Forces in North Korea.” 
 http://www.nkorea.or.kr/wizboard.php?BID=nkres_05&mode=view&UID=1&C 
URRENT_PAGE=1, accessed April 2014. 
 
"Introduction to Kaesong Industrial Zone for Investors." Korea Trade-Investment  
Promotion Agency Invest Korea (December 2013): 13-069. 
 
Jeon, Jeong Yun. "EU Agrees to Tougher Sanctions on North Korea." The Hankyoreh, 
 February 20, 2013. http://hani.co.kr/arti/ENGISSUE/102/574745.html, accessed  
March 2014. 
Jung, Eun-joo. "Kaesong-made Products Excluded from KORUS FTA by U.S."  
 
 




Jo, Dongho. “A Strategy for the Advancement of the North Korean Economy.” EAI Asia  
Security Initiative Working Paper 11, April 2011.  
 
Kang, Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot. The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the  
North  Korean Gulag. New York: Basic books, 2005. 
 
Kelly, Robert. “The German-Korean Unification Parallel,” The Korean Journal of  
Defense Analysis 23, no. 4 (December 2011): 461, 
http://www.kida.re.kr/data/kjda/ 02_Robert%20Kelly.pdf, accessed March 2014.   
 
Kerr, Paul. "North Korea Quits NPT, Says It Will Restart Nuclear Facilities." Arms  
Control Association, January/February 2003. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/nkorea_janfeb03, accessed accessed 
March 2014. 
 
Killick, James. "EU Lifts Sanctions Against Burma/Myanmar, Eases Measures Against  
Syria and Libya, and Tightens Sanctions Against North Korea." Lexology. April 
24, 2013. http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=08eefa6e-d67b-4555-
b045-9fe13b249e84,  accessed February 2014. 
 
Kim, Ji Yeon. "EU Sanctions on N. Korea Take Effect, Sacntions on Myanmar, Syria  
Eased." Arirang News, April 23, 2013. 
http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=146327, accessed March 
2014. 
 
Kim, Jungin. “A Study of the Roles of NGOs for North Korean Refugees’ Human  
Rights.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 8 (2010): 76-90. 
Kim, Suk Hi, and Semoon Chang.Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North Korea:  
An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company, 2003. 
 
Kim, Yong. Long Road Home: Testimony of a North Korean Camp Survivor. New York: 
 Columbia University Press, 2009. 
Kirgis, Frederic L. "North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation  
Treaty." American Society of International Law, January 2003. 
http://www.asil.org/insigh96.cfm, accessed March 2014. 
 
Korea JoongAng Daily. "North Korea Budget Amount."April 3, 2013.





Korean Culture and Information Service. “About Korea – Economy.” 
http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Economy/Overview, accessed March 2014. 
 
Korean Culture and Information Service. “About Korea –History.” 
http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Korea-at-a-Glance/History, accessed February 
2014. 
 
Ko, Sung Ho, Kiseon Chung, and Yoo-seok Oh. “North Korean Defectors.” Ford  
Foundation (2002). 
 
Ku, Charlotte, and Paul F Diehl.International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings.
 Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009. 
 
Lankov, Andrei. “The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism.” Asia Policy no.1  
(January 2006): 95-121. 
 
Lankov, Andrei. “North Korean Refugees in Northeast China.” Asian Survey 44, no.6  
(2004): 856-873. 
 
Lankov, Andrei. “Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change,” Foreign Affairs 
87, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 88-102. 
 
Lankov, Andrei. “Why Does China Continue to Support North Korea?” East Asia Forum,  
May 14, 2010.http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/14/why-does-china-
continue-to-support-north-korea/, accessed March 2014. 
 
Lee, Byung Shik. “NLL as the Actual Divisive Lin between North and North Korea.” 
YTN, December 21, 2012. http://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0101_201212211602011710,  
accessed April 2014. 
 
Lee, Eric Yong-Joong. "The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Dispute  
Resolution under the IAEA Safeguards Regime." Asian-Pacific Law & Policy 
Journal Vol. 5 (2004): 101-123. 
 
Lee, Keun, Byung-Yeom Kim, and Insook Lee. “The Possibility of Economic Reform in  
North Korea.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 2 (May 2009): 279-294. 
 
Lee, Jin Man. "EU Considering New North Korea Sanctions." CBC News, August 3,  
2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/03/08/north-korea-european-
union.html, accessed March 2014. 
 
Lee, Soon Ok. Eyes of the Tailless Animals: Prison Memoirs of a North Korean Woman. 
 Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Book Company, 1999. 
 
Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto and Christopher M. Meossner. "The Impact of International  
 
 
Trade on Decoracy: A Long-Run Perspective." World Politics 60, no. 4 (July 
2008): 539-575. 
  
Lynch, Mark. "The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring," Foreign Policy, November 28,  
2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_big_think, accessed 
March 2014. 
 
Maghraoui, Abdeslam. "Depoliticization in Morocco." Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4  
(October 2002): 24-32. 
 
Manyin, Mark E. and Dick K. Nanto. "The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial  
Complex." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 7-5700 (April 
2011): RL34093. 
 
Mansourov, Alexandre Y. ROK Turning Point. Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for  
Security Studies, 2005.  
 
Meredith, Charlotte. "North Korean Defector Reveals the Horrifying Conditions Inside  
Secretive State's Concentration Camps." The Huffington Post, October 12, 2013. 
 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/12/north-korea-defector- 
yodo_n_4088122.html, accessed April 2014.  
 
McKenna, Cameron. "EU Adopts Autonomous Sanctions Against North Korea."  
Lexology. April 18, 2013. 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0a32c09e-763c-40b4-a789-
2a3a6dad811c, accessed February 2014. 
 
Martin, Curtis H. “Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement as a  
Nonproliferation Tool.” The Nonproliferation Review (1999). 
 
Martin, Matthew. “The Six-Party Talks and New Opportunities to Strengthen Regional  
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Efforts.” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
(2008). 
 
Mathieson, Rosalind. "N. Korea Seeks New Talks on Its Nuclear Program, China Says."  
Bloomberg News. June 20, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/n-
korea-willing-to-restart-six-party-nuclear-talks-china-says.html, accessed January 
2014.  
 
May, Michael. “Verifying the Agreed Framework.” Center for Global Security Research  
(2001). 
 
Medeiros, Evan S. “The Possible Collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework:  





Milner, Helen V. and Keiko Kubota. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and  
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." International Organization 59, no.1 
(Winter 2005): 107-143.  
 
Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea. "Defense Budget Status."
 http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/subview.jsp?id=mnd_010201010000, 
 accessed March 2014. 
 
Nanto, Dick K. and Mark E. Manyin. "The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial  
Complex." Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (July 2007): 
RL34093. 
 
National Security Agency. “The Korean War: The SIGINT Background.” 
 http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/publications/ 
koreanwar_sigint_bkg.shtml#2, accessed March 2014. 
 
Nicewander, Amy L. “North Korean Defectors’ Adjustment to Life in South  
Korea.” Hamline University, 2013. 
 
Niksch, Larry. “U.S.-North Korean Relations: From the Agreed Frameworks to the Six- 
Party Talks.” International Journal of Korean Studies Vol. 9 No. 1 (2005). 
 
"N Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Pact." BBC News, January 10, 2003. 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2644593.stm, accessed March 2014. 
 
Nordin, Sara. "EU Updates Sanctions Measures Against Syria, North Korea and  
Zimbabwe." White & Case, March 2013. http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-
03042013/#.UaF8FkC1HDQ, accessed April 2014. 
 
“North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: A Horse Worth the Price.” The Economist, March 3,  
2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21548944, accessed April 2014. 
 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” THE  
NTI Website. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-
proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons, accessed April 2014. 
 
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Indianapolis, IN: Basic  
Books, 2001. 
 
Oliver, Christian. “South Korea’s K-Pop Takes Off in the West.” The Financial Times,  
February 10, 2012.http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ddf11662-53c7-11e1-9eac-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yGJkhz00, accessed April 2014. 
 
O, Tara. “The Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Problems and  




Oh, Kongdan and Ralph Hassig. “North Korea Between Collapse and Reform.” Asian 
 Survey 39, no. 2 (March/April 1999): 287-309. 
 
Park, Jong-Chul, Young-Ho Park, Moon-Young Huh, and Woo-Taek Hong. “The Six- 
Party Talks and Inter-Korean Relations: Prospects and Strategies.” KINU Policy 
Study (2003). 
 
Park, Robert. "The Forgotten Genocide: North Korea's Prison State." World Affairs  
Journal, July/August 2013. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/forgotten-
genocide-north-korea%E2%80%99s-prison-state, accessed February 2014. 
 
Pevehouse, Jon C. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and  
Democratization." International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 515-549. 
Pollack, Jonathan D. No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security.
 Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Preez, Jean, and William Potter. "North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality  
Check." James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/030409.htm, accessed March 2014. 
 
“Q&A: North Korea Nuclear Programme.” BBC News, April 24, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699, accessed January 2014. 
Rajagopalan, Megha. "Exclusive: Aid Groups to Suffer if EU Sanctions North Korean  
Bank." Reuters, April 9, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-
korea-north-bank-idUSBRE93900L20130410, accessed March 2014. 
Roland, Gerard. “Economic Theory and Transition: What Lessons from North Korea?.”  
In Keynote Lecture NAIS Conference. University of California, Berkeley, 
February 21, 2008. 
Riehl, Dan. "Missing 20,000 North Korean Prison Camps Inmates May Have Starved to  
Death." BreitBart, September 5, 2013. 
http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2013/09/05/Missing-20-000-North-Korean-
Prison-Camp-Inmates-May-Have-Starved-To-Death, accessed January 2014. 
"Sanctions Delay North Korea's Nuclear Program, U.N. Report Says." Huffington Post, 
 May 14, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/sanctions-north-korea- 
nuclear-program-un-report_n_3276318.html, accessed February 2014. 
 
Schoff, James L. and Yaron Eisenberg, Peace Regime Building On the Korean  
Peninsula: What's Next? (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Affairs, 
May 2009): 1-25. 
 
Schwarz, Rolf. "The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East:  
 
 
Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization." Review of International 
Political Economy 15, no. 4 (October 2008): 599-621.   
Sedghi, Ami. “South v North Korea: how do the two countries compare?.” April 8, 2013.  
The Guardian.http://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2013/apr/08/south-
korea-v-north-korea-compared, accessed April 2014. 
 
Shin, Dong Hyuk. Escaped from North Korean Restricted Prison Camps. Seoul, Korea:  
North  Korean Human Rights Information Center, 2007. 
 
Shin, Hyon-Hee. "Hopes Rising for Restart of Six-Party Talks." The Korea Herald,  
November 4, 2013. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131104000609, 
accessed November 28, 2013. 
 
Sigal, Leon V. "How North Korea Evades Financial Sanctions." 38 North, May 3, 2013. 
 http://38north.org/2013/05/lsigal050313/, accessed March 2014. 
 
Spiller, Harry. American POWs in Korea: Sixteen Personal Accounts. Jefferson, NC:  
McFarland & Company Inc., 1998. 
 
Starr, Barbara. “North Korea May Not Have ‘Full Control’ of Satellite, U.S. Officials  
Says.” CNN, December 12, 2012. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/12/north-
korea-may-not-have-full-control-of-satellite-u-s-official-says/?hpt=hp_t2, 
accessed March 2014. 
 
Stuart, Hunter. "Did Thousands of North Koreans Disappear from Huge Prison Camp?"  
The Huffington Post, September 6, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/06/north-koreans 
disappeared_n_3880881.html, accessed March 2014. 
 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations. "The  
Hidden Gulag: Putting Human Rights on the North Korea policy Agenda." United  
States Senate, 2012. 
 
Szoldra, Paul. "The Stories from Inside North Korea's Prison Camps are Horrifying."  
Business Insider, September18, 2013. http://www.businessinsider.com/north-
korea-prison-camps-2013-9, accessed February 2014. 
 
The Chosun Ilbo Online. "New Threat from N. Korea's 'Asymmetrical' Warfare." April 
29,2010.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/04/29/2010042901362 
.html, accessed April 2014. 
 
The Economist. “Reforming the World Bank: Zen and the art of poverty reduction.”  





accessed April 2014. 
 




The International Atomic Energy Agency. “About Us.” The IAEA Website. 
http://www.iaea.org/About/, accessed March 2014. 
 
Toolan, Brendan. “Korean Spring? An Analysis of the Arab Spring and its Relevance for 
 North Korea,” M.A. diss., Virginia Military Institute, 1998. 
 
Torres, Ida. "Negotiators Trying to Restart Six-Party Talks for North Korea's Nuclear  
Program." Japan Daily Press, November 8, 2013. 
http://japandailypress.com/negotiators-trying-to-restart-six-party-talks-for-north-
koreas-nuclear-program-0839225, accessed February 2014.   
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency. “Our Work.” The IAEA Website. 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/, accessed March 2014. 
 
Thornton, Judith. “Benchmarking North Korea Economic Policies; The Lesson from  
Russia and China.” in Conference North Korea – Guideposts for radical 
Economic Change. Washington, DC, February 8, 2007. 
 
UNDP. “UNDP in the Republic of Korea – 1966 to 2009.” 
http://www.undp.org/content/seoul_policy_center/en/home/operations/undp-in-
the-republic-of-korea, accessed February 2014. 
 
United Nations. “Country Profile – Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, accessed April 2014. 
 
United Nations. “Country Profile – Republic of Korea.” 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Republic%20of%20Korea, 
accessed March 2014. 
 
United Nations. “Security Council Resolutions.”  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml, accessed March 
2014. 
 
United Nations. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”  
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml, accessed March 2014. 
 
United Nations. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”  
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml, accessed March 2014. 
 
 
United Nations. "UNdata." 
 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUSD
 %3BpcFlag%3A1, accessed March 2014. 
 
United States Department of State. “Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China.”  
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm, accessed March 2014. 
 
United States Department of State. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
Weapons.” http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html, accessed 
March 2014. 
 
United States Department of State. “UN Security Council Resolution 1540.”  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm, accessed March 2014. 
 
United States Department of State. “US Relations with South Korea.” 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm, accessed February 2014. 
 
"U.N. Panel: Sanctions Delaying NKorea Nuke Program." CBS News, May 17, 2013. 
 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57585149/u.n-panel-sanctions-delaying- 
nkorea-nuke-program, accessed March 2014. 
 
"US Wants EU to Sanction North Korean Bank." Accuracy in Media, 03/27/2013. 
 http://www.aim.org/newswire/us-wants-eu-to-sanction-north-korean-bank/,  
accessed March 2014. 
 
Walker, Tim. "A Life of Torture, Starvation and Executions: Inside North Korea's  
Horrifying Cruel Prison Camps." The Independent, August 21, 2013. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/a-life-of-torture-
starvation-and-executions-inside-north-koreas-horrifyingly-cruel-prison-camps-
8777170.html, accessed March 2013. 
 
World Report 2013. "North Korea." Human Rights Watch (2013). Yoon, Yeo Sang, Ja  
Eun Lee and Sun Young Han. The North Korean Prison Camps Operation 
 System and Human Rights Violations. Seoul, Korea: North Korean Human Rights 
 Information Center, 2011. 
 
Wit, Joel S., Jon Wolfsthal, and Choong-Suk Oh. "The Six Part Talks and Beyond:  
Cooperative Threats Reduction and North Korea." CSIS International Security 
Program (2005). 
 
“Why Does North Korea Need Nuclear Weapons?” Oriental Review. May 12, 2010.  
http://orientalreview.org/2010/05/12/why-does-north-korea-need-nuclear-
weapons, accessed February 2014. 
 
Willrich, Mason “The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear  
 
 
Technology Confronts World Politics.” The Yale Law Journal. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/794833, accessed March 2014. 
 
Winters, Matthew, Choosing to Target: What Types of Countries Get Different Types of  
World Bank Projects.” World Politics 62, no. 3 (July 2010): 422-458, via JSTOR, 
accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “About.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/about, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “About – Leadership – Board of Directors.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/directors, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Alden Winship ("Tom") Clausen.”  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIV
ES/0,,contentMDK:20487071~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00
.html, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Egypt – All Projects.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/projects/all, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Egypt Project & Programs.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/projects, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Egypt Overview.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview, accessed April 2014. 
 
“World Bank, Growth and Poverty.” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no.27  
(July, 2000): 2367-2368, via JSTOR, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Results.” http://www.worldbank.org/results, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Robert Strange McNamara.”  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIV
ES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00
.html, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Tunisia – All Projects.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/projects/all, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “What We Do.” http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do, accessed  
April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Yemen Overview.”  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Bank. “Yemen – All Projects.”  
 
 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/projects/all, April 2014. 
 
World Bank News. “A New Relationship for Changing Times.” July 11, 2012.  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/07/11/new-relationship-
changing-times, accessed April 2014. 
 
World Trade Organization. “Korea, Republic of.” 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Co
untry=KR, accessed March 2014. 
 
Yun, Sarah. "Kaesong Industrial Complex: Is It Changing the DPRK?" Johns Hopkins  
University SAIS US-Korea Institute (2009). 
 
Zoellick, Robert B. “Why we still need the World Bank.” Foreign Affairs, March 2012.  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137243/robert-b-zoellick/why-we-still-
need-the-world-bank, accessed April 2014. 
 
 
 
